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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue 1: Did the trial court err when, in the face of conflicting expert testimony, it
relied upon the opinions favoring summary judgment and ignored the expert evidence
against summary judgment?

Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered
"under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's
analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cty., 2011 UT 63,

~

8, 266 P.3d

797 (citation omitted). "In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and recite the facts accordingly." Goldenwest Fed. Credit Union
v. Kenworthy . 2017 UT App 9,
App 126,

~

~

~

2, 391 P.3d 388 (quoting Ockey v. Club Jam, 2014 UT

2 n. 2, 328 P.3d 880) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). "A
~

trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review them for
correctness." Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).

Preservation: (R. 398-457, 724-758.)
Issue 2: Did the court err in ruling that a golf professional's subjective belief
about what was being offered in a golf contest can create a binding contract when there
was no dispute, and the court found as a fact that the offeror intended to exclude
professional golfers from the contest it sponsored? In other words, in the absence of any
writing or statement, anywhere, that a car was being offered as a hole-in-one prize, and if
a car dealer merely puts a car and a sponsorship sign on a tee box at a golf tournament
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without indicating that the winner gets, e.g., a TV, or a one-year car lease, or a two-year
car lease, or any other prize, and when the golfers know nothing about what prize or
prizes are being offered for any of the contests, is a professional golfer entitled to the full
MSRP value of the car that happens to be on the tee box if they make a hole-in-one?
Standard of Review:

The existence, or not, of a contract is a legal issue.

"Whether a contract exists is a legal determination, and we therefore review a district
court's conclusion as to that issue for correctness." Thomas v. Mattena, 2017 UT App.
81, ,r 6, 397 P.3d 856 (citation omitted). "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds
on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contact. An
agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003
UT 37,

,r

11, 78 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A "contract

may be enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left to be agreed
upon, but if the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether
the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Id.
internal quotation marks omitted).

,r

12 (citation and

"The court must be able to enforce the contract

according to the parties' intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually
existed, there can be no contract to enforce." Id.
Preservation: (R. 398-457, 721, 724-758.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

WAYMENT SUED NATE WADE WITHOUT TERMS, OR PRIVITY.

On August 20, 2015, Plaintiff Brett Wayment ("Plaintiff' or "Wayment"), a
professional golfer, filed a complaint against Defendant Schneider Automotive Group,
LLC, aka Nate Wade Subaru ("Nate Wade") claiming he was owed a new car because he
hit a hole-in-one on a golf hole sponsored by Nate Wade. (R. 1-6.) The Tournament was

2
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a charity fundraiser sponsored by the Big League Dreams Foundation at Hidden Valley
Country Club on June 1, 2015 1 (hereafter "Tournament"). In his Complaint, Wayment
never claimed to have seen anything in writing promising him, nor being orally told by
anyone, that by hitting a hole-in-one he would win a car. (Id.) Although Wayment had
no privity with nor any communications of any kind with Nate Wade, Wayment claimed
that Nate Wade had breached an alleged contract with him, and that Nate Wade was
estopped from denying him a new car by reason of a promise it allegedly made. (Id.)
Without knowing which car, and whether he would have the car for a year, two years, or
permanently, Wayment claimed he was entitled to ownership, rather than mere use of the
kind of car that he had seen on the hole's tee box. (Id.)

B.

WAYMENT MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AMONG
CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS.

After the completion of discovery, including the parties' variously obtaining
declarations and deposition testimony from their respective experts, Wayment filed his
238-page motion for summary judgment on June 9, 2016 (the "Motion"). (R. 147-385.)
The Motion relied entirely upon a theory of unilateral contract, and made no mention of
Wayment's promissory estoppel claim.2

~

Importantly, Wayment put before the court

expert opinion evidence that there is no uniformity of rules concerning professional
golfers competing for prizes at amateur events. (R. 157.)
On July 6, 2016, Nate Wade opposed the motion with expert and fact evidence,
and moved to strike the inadmissible evidence on which Wayment had relied. (R. 398The Tournament took place on June 1, 2015. ·The Complaint alleged an incorrect date
of June 4, 2015.
2
The trial court's ruling said nothing of promissory estoppel, and so Nate Wade assumes
here that Wayment's promissory estoppel claims are not at issue and need not be
addressed here. In any event, Wayment admitted he had no communications of any kind
with Nate Wade prior to hitting his hole-in-one.
1

3
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457, 392-396.) There were declarations and deposition testimony from four different
experts before the trial court, concerning whether a professional golfer in Wayment's
position should expect to be eligible to win a hole-in-one prize at the Tournament. On
behalf of Wayment, those experts were Wayment himself, offering his self-serving
"expert" opinion as a professional golfer, (R. 217-221 ), and Devin Dehlin, an official
from the Utah Section of the Professional Golfer's Association (R. 248-255). They each
opined that without an express exclusion, Wayment was entitled to think he was eligible
for the hole-in-one contest.
Nate Wade offered contrary testimony from two independent experts. One was a
professional golfer named Todd Tanner, who with 18 years' experience opined that
Wayment should not have expected to be e~igible to win a prize, unless professionals
were expressly included in the contests. (R. 450-51, Addendum 4 (Tanner Deel.)). Nate
Wade's other expert was Ryan Kartchner, the golf professional at Hidden Valley Golf
Club, where the Tournament was played. (R. 380-83, 436-37, 439-44, 446). Like
Wayment, Kartchner submitted a post-deposition declaration in connection with the
Motion (R. 439). He confirmed his opinions set forth in Nate Wade's disclosure of
expert opinion testimony.
C.

KARTCHNER BECAME THE FOCUS OF WAYMENT'S MOTION, WITHNO MENTION OF TANNER.

The standard that Wayment presented to the trial court was whether a professional
golfer in Wayment 's position could reasonably believe he had accepted an offer of
ownership of a car in exchange for a hole-in-one, even though there was nothing in
writing, or orally, telling him or any other player in the Tournament that use or ownership
of any car, or which car, was a prize. (R. 701, Addendum 3 (Hearing Tr. 9/30/2016).) In
support of his motion, Wayment relied in part upon a deposition statement of Nate
4
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Wade's expert witness, Ryan Kartchner, which statement purportedly contradicted
Kartchner's declaration and expert disclosures. (R. 156, 439-44.) Without Kartchner's

~

deposition statement, Wayment advised the court he "probably wouldn't have filed" the
Motion (R. 715), acknowledging to the trial court that without that statement, there was
likely a material fact issue. (R. 709.) Wayment put Kartchner's deposition testimony
before the trial court, however, prior to Kartchner having been afforded his due time to
make any changes and clarifications to his testimony. 3 In his motion, Wayment also
noted that Nate Wade had made objections to the question preceding Kartchner's
statement, but omitted from his filing what those objections were. (R. 156.) Prior to
opposing the motion, Nate Wade's counsel invited Wayment to withdraw his motion
until Mr. Kartchner's testimony had become final. (R. 448.) Wayment refused.
In the relevant portion of his deposition testimony, Kartchner was asked if he
believed it "is" reasonable for Wayment to believe he was eligible to compete for the
prize at the Tournament. (R. 412.) Nate Wade made three discrete objections to that
question, on foundation, incomplete hypothetical, and state of mind of a third person. 4
Kartchner's deposition response after these objections was not that it is reasonable, but
that such a belief "would" be reasonable. In response to Nate Wade's objections, and to
Kartchner's equivocal response, Wayment elected to not lay additional foundation, did
not complete the hypothetical, and did not confirm whether Kartchner had even read

3

Wayment claimed he filed his motion for summary judgment only a couple days before
Kartchner's deposition changes were due. (R. 717-718.) In fact Mr. Kartchner made his
deposition change on June 15, six days after the Motion was filed and nine days before it
was otherwise due on June 23.
4
Nate Wade noted the deposition objections in its moving papers and asked at the
hearing that the trial court sustain the deposition objections. (R. 412-13, 739-40.) Nate
Wade further pointed out at the hearing that Kartchner had not read Wayment' s
deposition, and thus could not opine on his state of mind. (R. 749-50.)
5
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Wayment's deposition. In short, Wayment never followed up to ask why Kartchner's
~

answer was a conditional "would," rather than an unqualified "yes." (Id.) Ultimately,
Kartchner reaffirmed his opinions by way of his declaration on July 1, 2016 (R. 439) and
timely clarified his conditional response by saying Wayment's belief would be
reasonable "under some circumstances."

(R. 446.)

Among Kartchner's deposition

answer, his changes, and his declaration and expert opinions, the trial court found that
Kartchner's "would" was "definitive". (R. 758.)
D.

THE TRIAL COURT FOUND SOME FACTS, AND IGNORED OTHERS

On September 30, 2016, the trial court heard argument on the pending motions
and ruled from the bench in favor of Wayment. (R. 758.) At the hearing, the trial court
made several findings on the record, all of which were incorporated by reference into the
order or final judgment. (R. 606-07, Addendum 1 (Order 10/28/2016).) Among them
~

was the express factual finding that Nate Wade intended to offer a car "to any amateur
who made ·a hole-in-one." (R. 752 (emphasis added).) The court also acknowledged that
there was nothing "extremely detailed" in writing. (R. 754.) The court stated that "most
important[]" there was a car on the tee box. (Id.) Although Nate Wade had shown the
trial court that there are many different ways to "win" a car, including leases for various
lengths of time (R. 735), the trial court did not mention this in its ruling. The trial court
also did not mention in its ruling that while Nate Wade indisputably intended to offer a
car to amateurs, no players at the Tournament, including Wayment, were ever told that
the use of or ownership of a car was the prize. Wayment and ultimately the trial court
ignored the opinion of Nate Wade's other expert professional golfer, Todd Tanner, who
related that he had once made a hole-in-one and not collected the prize for the very
reason that he was a professional. (R. 451.) The trial court made no mention of the

6
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Tanner declaration and focused instead on the statement that Kartchner had made in his
deposition over Nate Wade's objection, and to which Kartchner had made a timely
change. (R. 757-58.) The trial court allowed Kartchner's deposition change to stand, and
considered it in spite of Wayment's objections to those changes. (Id.)
E.

THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULED NATE WADE'S OBJECTIONS TO
THE FORM OF ORDER.

After Wayment submitted a proposed order, Nate Wade objected to the form of
that order on October 21, 2016, and provided an alternative form of order. (R. 556-68.)
By this objection, Nate Wade gave the trial court an opportunity to confirm its statement
in open court that it was going to allow Mr. Kartchner's deposition change to stand, but
~

did not believe the change affected the court's ruling. On October 28, 2016, the trial
court issued a ruling that incorporated by reference all of its factual and legal findings
expressed during the hearing, implicitly overruled Nate Wade's deposition objections,
denied Nate Wade's motion to strike portions of Wayment's evidence, and entered the
order granting summary judgment. (R. 606-07.)

F.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINAL JUDGMENT INFERRED MAXIMUM
DAMAGES.

On November 21, 2016, the trial court entered Final Judgment against Nate Wade
in the amount of $29,095.26. (R. 622-24, Addendum 2 (Ruling 11/21/2016).) The
manufacturer's suggested retail price ("MSRP") of the car was $24,217.

~

(R. 385,

Addendum 5 (invoice).) Although Nate Wade had presented evidence to the trial court
that the dealer cost of the car was $22,967.00, and that no customer would ever pay more
than MSRP for a car (R. 196, 200), the trial court awarded as damages the value of the
full MSRP of the car, making the most aggressive inference on damages against Nate
Wade that it could. On December 22, 2016, Nate Wade filed its notice of appeal (R. 632-

7
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~

33), and following Nate Wade's motion to extend the time to appeal, on December 29,
2016 the trial court entered its order authorizing Nate Wade's appeal under Rule 4(e)(2)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (R. 669-70.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

THE TOURNAMENT WAS INTENDED FOR AMATEURS.

On June 1, 2015, the Big League Dreams Foundation held a charity golf
tournament at the Hidden Valley Country Club golf course. The organizers of the
Tournament never intended that professionals (as opposed to amateurs) would be eligible
to compete for any prizes offered in the Tournament. (R. 454.) Thus, the participation or
not of professional golfers never came up as a topic of discussion among the tournament
organizers. (R. 169.) Wayment was the only professional playing in the Tournament.
(R. 442.) There is no uniformity of opinion among professional golfers as to whether
they are eligible for prizes in tournaments that are intended for amateurs, regardless of
whether there are signs expressly including or excluding them. (R. 254, 382, 383, 437,
vj

441, 450-451.)
On the day of the Tournament, a brochure was placed on the golf carts used by the
players. (R. 405; 373, Addendum 6 (brochure).)

(i

2015 Big League Dreams Foundation
Golf Tournament
Men tao off from Blue Tees. Women from Sliver Tees.
Format Is a 4 person Scramble. 1All i;loycrs toe off from ,cspocUve toe box. Choose the best
drive and au pleyors play next shot from there (wllhln a club Jonglh, no closer to lhc tiola and nu
Improved llo}. Procodur& Is folfo'wed on eacil shol for tho rematnder or the hole. With putts, the
Urst ball lo go In lho holo ~s countoct ror tho loam 8Core. Po not 'tap in' herurc au plnyers huve
.
lakon lh61f shol.
Valley Courso 111
Valloy Course #8

• Longest Drive contost {Men & Woman). Must be lr1 the fairway lo count.
- Hole In Ono

Lakos Course #4
• Longest Pull (Men & Women)
Lnkos Course 117 - Closest to tho Pin (Mon & Women
Lake Course 1/6 - All players must lotl off wllh the basobAII bat on 1ho hnsobull teo. Scramblo
rules the root of tho way,

8
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Tournament officials referred to that brochure as a " description of each activity during
the event." (R. 171.)

It was never the purpose of that brochure to convey information

about the Tournament being limited to amateurs. (R. 173.) It said nothing about what
any of the prizes being offered for various contests during the Tournament would be, and
in particular said nothing about a car being offered on Hole No. 8 for a hole-in-one.
(R. 171, 373.)
B.

NATE WADE DID OFFER A CAR, BUT ONLY TO AMATEURS.
Nate Wade did intend to sponsor the gth hole of the Tournament. It authorized a
th

sign to be placed on the tee box of the 8 hole.

Valley Hole #8
B,fl

~ o,.wru Found•oon l hMlo

D

Nate Wade Subaru
Nnto Wade Subaru

2015 Blu

IIStsJ

uiBs,uo Oreum!I Fourv.Jouon

Toumi)me11t Ho1e Spoaoor

(R. 204; 225, Addendum 7 (sign).) Neither the brochure nor the sponsor sign indicated
what prize (if any) Nate Wade was offering. Nate Wade acknowledged in its Response to
Request for Admission # 1 that it intended to offer a car, but on its own specific terms and
conditions, with the possibility of a prize of a 2015 Subaru XV Crosstrek car. (R. 204.)
Nate V✓ade's conditions were that the hole-in-one would have to be hit on the day of the
Tournament, by a Tournament participant, from the correct yardage, that it be made by an
amateur, and that someone witness the hole-in-one. (R. 191.) Nate Wade acknowledges
these conditions were not communicated to the golfers (R. at 192), but then neither was

9
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the nature of the prize communicated to them. Nate Wade was never informed that a
professional would be playing in the Tournament. (R. 194.) It was undisputed that those
conditions were expressed to Nate Wade's insurance company. (Id.) The value of the
car that Nate Wade had intended to offer was $22,967.00, $6,000 less than the judgment
awarded by the trial court. (R. 196, 622-23.) Nate Wade testified that a consumer would
never pay more than the MSRP value of the car. (R. 200.)
C.

NO PLAYER WAS TOLD, ORALLY OR IN WRITING, THAT A CAR
WAS OFFERED AS A PRIZE .... EXCEPT WAYMENT
Before finishing their rounds the day of the Tournament, not one golfer was told,

orally or in writing, that they would win a car by hitting a hole-in-one on Hole No. 8.
Except, of course, Wayment. On just one occasion during this entire case, when he was
asked under oath in his deposition, Wayment claimed he had seen a sign promising him
the car. The fact is that prior to his motion being heard, Wayment had four opportunities
to describe what he saw on the golf course that day. Only once did he claim to have seen
a sign promising him a car.

And yet in the Complaint, in his motion for summary

judgment, and in his post-deposition declaration, Wayment never mentioned a sign
promising him a car. And none of the three other players with him that day recall seeing
such a sign. (R. 233-34, 430, 434.)

D.

WAYMENT SAW ONLY THE BROCHURE, A CAR AND A NATE WADE
SIGN.
In his Declaration filed in support of his motion for summary judgment, Wayment

~

claimed to have seen only three things suggesting to him that he could win a car by
hitting a hole-in-one.

One was the brochure that he called a "rule sheet" (the cart

brochure that mentioned nothing about a car), another was a Nate Wade Subaru logo and
sign (again with no mention of offering a car), and the last was a Subaru car parked near

10
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the tee box. (R. 218.) There were no writings, anywhere, indicating what the prizes were
for any of the contests at the Tournament, and most of the prizes awarded for other
contests that were mentioned in the brochure were gift certificates at the pro shop. (R.
178.)
Before hitting his shot, Wayment did not look at the sticker or the price of the car,
neither was he familiar with the model of the car. He only paid attention to the car after
he hit the hole-in-one. (R. 424.) When asked what made him believe Nate Wade had
made an offer to him, he testified he relied solely on the "rule sheet" (which said nothing
of Nate Wade, nor of a car), and the Nate Wade sign on the tee box. (R. 427.)
E.

AT THE PRIZE LUNCHEON, WAYMENT WAS NOT TOLD HE HAD
WON A CAR.

At the prize luncheon following play at the Tournament, Wayment's hole-in-one
was acknowledged by the people hosting the event, but he was not told that he had won a
car.

(R. 238-39, 437.) In fact, Kartchner, as the pro of the Club and when awarding

prizes at the luncheon, did not tell Wayment that he had won a car because Kartchner
knew Wayment was a professional golfer.

(R. 437.)

Kartchner was aware that

professional golfers, like Wayment, were customarily not eligible to win prizes at events
like the Tournament. (R. 437, 451.)
When Wayment attempted to claim the car, Nate Wade learned about his
professional status and refused to award it to him. Wayment then filed suit claiming
breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This Court should reverse and remand the trial court's grant of summary judgment
because there were genuine issues of material fact and because one element of an offer
cannot be divorced from the undisputed conditions the offeror attached to that offer. In
11
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granting summary judgment, the trial court chose to believe some expert opinions over
others, without making the inferences against summary judgment that it was obligated to
make. There is a fact issue whether professionals like Wayment, playing from the same
tees as amateur golfers, are eligible for prizes in competition with amateurs. The. trial
court also held Nate Wade to one element of the offer that Nate Wade intended to make,
but expressly ignored the other undisputed, limiting factors to that offer.
Nate Wade acknowledges it did not express any elements of its offer to
Tournament participants. It did not tell them what tees to hit from. It did not tell them
the tees would have to be a certain yardage. It did not tell them there would have to be a
witness. It did not tell them a car was the prize. And it did not tell them amateurs were
the only eligible participants. The trial court erroneously held Nate Wade to one part of
its offer that was never expressed to any Tournament participant- that a car was the prize
- while ignoring and holding against Nate Wade the undisputed limiting conditions Nate
Wade placed on that offer.

Absent other contradictory statements, a court may not

divorce from the willingness to give a car the limitation that only amateurs were eligible.
The trial court erred in finding the existence of the car on the tee box as
dispositive, as it begs the question of what should happen if Nate Wade had intended
instead to offer, e.g., a TV. Because it is a car dealer, there was nothing irregular about
Nate Wade parking a car on the tee box. The trial court was comforted by, and treated as
dispositive, the fact that Nate Wade intended to offer the car. But what if Nate Wade had
· intended to offer a set of irons, or a trip to Disneyland, yet parked a car on the tee as part
of its advertising and promotional methods?
This Court should reject Wayment's claim that because he subjectively believed
and expected he was entitled to a car, Nate Wade should give him one. That, simply, is

12
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Wayment's legal and factual position. Utah law, however, requires much more. It is
undisputed that Wayment saw nothing and heard nothing telling him the ownership of a
new car was being offered to him before he hit his hole-in-one. Wayment claims, of
course, (and it is disputed) that he saw another ~ign on the hole, with unrecalled words to
the effect of promising a car for a hole-in-one.
witnesses dispute such a sign was there.

But no one else saw it, and other

The trial court rightly excluded that

inconsistency from its analysis, but Utah law requires a writing or some other firm
communication of terms, including what prize is being offered and under what
circumstances, to award the full MSRP value of a car here. The trial court erred in not
requiring at least some writing or statement explaining what the prize would be.
To make Nate Wade surrender a new car to Wayment, Utah law required a
contract. The law of unilateral contract on which Wayment relied, which is inherently
one-sided, makes that unilaterality fair only so long as the offeror's terms are adequately
spelled out. The trial court erred in believing some but not all of the disputed and nonuniform expert testimony before it. It erred in making the inference that professionals
were included simply because they were not excluded. It was never necessary to exclude
Wayment (and other professionals) from the offer, because it is undisputed they were
never included. The trial court allowed into evidence immaterial and irrelevant facts.
Because Wayment is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Court should
reverse the trial court's ruling, remand the case, and clarify the law in Utah that at a
minimum, absent a writing of some kind advising tournament participants what the prize
for a contest is, a participant cannot form even a subjectively reasonable belief that they
are entitled to a particular prize by way of a unilateral contract.

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

ARGUMENT

Wayment' s argument is cast as a simple breach of a unilateral contract: offer,
acceptance, and failure to perform. And yet, among the extraordinary number of exhibits
attached to Wayment's 238-page motion, there is not a single writing offering a car to
anyone. None. Without that, Utah law cannot support a unilateral, or any other kind of
contract.
Nate Wade never offered to form a unilateral contract with Wayment, and the
surrounding circumstances do not support a finding of an implied-in-fact unilateral
contract. Neither was there a meeting of the minds or an objective manifestation of intent
to offer the contract that the trial court found. With no cognizable offer, there can be no
breach of contract, and this Court should reverse the trial court and remand.

I.

NATE WADE DID NOT OFFER TO FORM A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
WITH ANY PROFESSIONAL GOLFER, INCLUDING WAYMENT.

The trial court found as a matter of undisputed fact that Nate Wade intended to
include only amateurs in the contest. (R. 752.) Thus Wayment was never included in the
~

offer, and there was never a meeting of the minds with respect to all of the contract terms
between Nate Wade and Wayment. Utah law requires a meeting of the minds for a
unilateral contract or for any contract. "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on
the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract." Richard
Barton Enters. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). The terms on
which the minds must meet must be detailed. "[T]his meeting of the minds must be
spelled out, either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient detail to be enforced." Republic
Grp., Inc. v. Won-Door Corp .. 883 P.2d 285, 294 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation
omitted). Without such a meeting, there is no contract. A "meeting of the minds" forms
"a necessary element of contract formation." Burningham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd., 317
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P.3d 445 (citation omitted). "An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite
or demonstrate that there was no intent to contract." Tsern, 928 P.2d at 373. Other

~

courts have recognized, too, that this meeting of the minds is particularly critical to a
claimed unilateral contract, like Wayment claims here. Klamen v. Genuine Parts Co.,
848 S. W .2d 3 8, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("Without a meeting of the minds in a unilateral
contract ... there would be no cognizable offer, and acceptance would be impossible.").
Nate Wade did not offer, either in_ writing or orally, to form a unilateral contract
with Wayment as a professional golfer. Nate Wade did not post, publish, or proclaim
anything stating that a hole-in-one shooter would win a car. Nate Wade was listed as a
hole sponsor at the tee box. As a car dealer, of course one of its cars was displayed. As to
the contest on Hole #8, the brochure provided by the Tournament stated, "Valley Course
#8 - Hole-in-one." The brochure said nothing of Nate Wade. The brochure said nothing
/{(;.;.,

of a car of any kind, nor whether ownership or merely use of the car for a period of time
was the prize. And it is undisputed that the brochure did not contain all of the conditions
concerning Nate Wade's offer to award a prize for a hole-in-one. If the car on the tee box
had been a 30-year-old Fiat, would that have created a binding contract? If the vehicle on
the tee box were a Vespa scooter, would that have created a contract? The answer under
Utah law of contract is no, unless those prizes are spelled out as a term by some
communication.
Any offer to form a unilateral contract must be defined by statements sufficiently
clear to identify what is offered. Nate Wade never intended to offer, nor did it manifest
any intent to offer, any prize to any professional golfers. The parties do not dispute that
Wayment is a professional golfer.

15
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II.

NO IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT EXISTED.

Wayment's self-serving and subjective beliefs and opinions do not require Nate
Wade to turn over a car. Any argument that a unilateral contract is implied-in-fact based
on Wayment's "reasonable beliefs" is misguided.

In Utah, "for an implied-in-fact

[unilateral] contract term to exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a
unilateral contract.

There must be a manifestation of the [offerer's] intent that is

communicated to the [offeree] and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract
~

provision." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). Although
Nate Wade did park a car on the tee box, it communicated nothing to Wayment about
whether the prize was outright title to the car, a one-year, two-year, or even a one-month
lease. "[I]t is clear that the evidence must be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a
unilateral offer." Id. (emphasis added).

The brochure, which simply stated "Valley

Course #8 - Hole-in-one," and the tee sign, which stated only the hole number with Nate
Wade's logo, cannot as a matter of law constitute manifested terms sufficiently definite to
operate as contractual provisions offering the car, or any car, to particularly the only
professional golfer playing with all of those amateurs that day.
Wayment stated that his reasonable reliance was based on Nate Wade failing to
expressly exclude professional golfers from any prize winning. That begs the question,
however. Where did Nate Wade ever promise a car to anyone, let alone to a professional
like Wayment? This merely emphasizes the undisputed fact that Nate Wade made no
express inclusions either. The burden is not on Nate Wade to disavow a promise of
award, but rather on Wayment to demonstrate that the undisputed facts showed that
Nate Wade communicated a sufficiently clear manifestation of intent to offer the entire
~

car to everyone, including professional golfers. It is undisputed there was no such offer
or, at the very least, there is a fact question that precluded summary judgment.
16
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Finally, under Utah law, "the existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual
question committed to the sound discretion of the jury." Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing
Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). Similarly, "[r]easonable reliance
is generally a factual matter, within the province of the finder of fact .... " Timothy v. Teri
~

Keetch, Thomas Keetch, Appellants, 251 P.3d 848, 850 (Utah. Ct. App. 2011). As such,
particularly with a clear fact issue among the experts, Wayment was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law based on his assertions that he subjectively believed that
Nate Wade offered to award him a car for shooting a hole-in-one.

III.

WAYMENT'S CASES DO NOT SUPPORT FINDING A UNILATERAL
CONTRACT HERE.

~

The cases cited by Wayment in support of his theory were inapposite. In Cobaugh
v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., a Pennsylvania case, the court relied heavily upon the defendant's
"making public the conditions and rules of the contest," including "its signs, [which]
offered to award the car as a prize to anyone who made a hole-in-one at the ninth hole."
561 A.2d 1248, 1249-50 (Pa. 1989).

While Wayment made the one claim in his

deposition that he saw such a sign, for purposes of the Motion the trial court was .

<½v

obligated to ignore that, and assume as a fact that there was no sign. Thus this case lacks
the terms and specificity that the writings in Cobaugh provided. Similarly, in Harms v.
Northland Ford Dealers, a South Dakota case, the court focused on "the promulgated
contest rules" in determining that the defendant "must abide by the rules it announced,
not by the ones it left unannounced." 602 N.W.2d 58, 61 (S.D. 1999).

Here, it is

undisputed that Nate Wade did not promulgate or announce any contest rules.

It

provided no publications that would indicate that professionals or anyone else would be
entitled to a car for making a hole-in-one.

Both of the cases Wayment relied upon

involved situations in which a defendant publicly manifested its intent to award a .car for
17
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anyone who shot a hole-in-one. Those situations contrast to this one, where not a single
writing or statement that any participant saw or heard promised a car ... to anyone.

IV.

THE ONLY UTAH CASE CITED GOES AGAINST WAYMENT.
The only Utah authority Wayment cited, Walters v. National Beverages, Inc.,

showed there was no merit to his Motion. There, a plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to
enforce an implied contest rule to receive a prize. 422 P.2d 524 (Utah 1967). In Walters,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had promised to award prizes in a specified order.
Id. at 525. The court disagreed, determining that the defendants' offer was not subject to
the plaintiffs subjective interpretation and was rather limited to the "offer contained in
the entry forms .... " Id. Nate Wade similarly cannot be bound by Wayment's subjective
belief that he was entitled to win a car if he shot a hole-in-one. There was no offer in any
entry forms for the Tournament. Nate Wade never made that or any other representation
to Wayment. As such, the trial court was obligated to make inferences against summary
judgment, and it erred in failing to do so.

CONCLUSION
Because Wayment did not and cannot satisfy the elements of his claims, and
because Nate Wade is entitled to all reasonable inferences in his favor, this Court should
reverse the trial court's ruling and remand the case to the trial court. More importantly,
this Court should clarify Utah law that in contests like these, no reasonable expectation of
a particular prize may exist without at the very least a written or oral expression of the
terms and conditions of the contest, including the prize itself.

18
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DATED this 6th day of September, 2017.

Marko.Morris
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
/ ;_.:-:•::-._;;~J.::.:.\ \
Dated: October 28, 2016
/s/ PAIGij P~~p.~ · ~

05:20:51 PM

Districf{gu,r-(}itjie./
··<fYiti ;,~;.~••:·

~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRETT WAYMENT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company, dba NATE
WADE SUBARU,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE

Case No. 150905943

Judge Paige Petersen
Defendant.

Tier One
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Proposed Order, and Defendant's objection to the
Proposed Order. After consideration of the arguments of counsel, the Court documents its oral
ruling of September 30, 2016 as follows. The Court gave more detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the record, and incorporates those by reference into this Order.
On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff Brett Wayment's Motion for Summary Judgment and

G&I

Defendant Schneider Automotive Group, LLC's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of the
Declarations of Brett Wayment, Devin Dehlin and Kasey Christensen came on regularly for hearing.
Plaintiff was represented by David Wahlquist and Adam Wahlquist of Kirton McConkie. Defendant
was represented by Mark Morris of Snell & Wilmer. Having fully considered the parties filings,
objections to evidence, the arguments of counsel, and otherwise being fully advised,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of the

October 28, 2016 05:20 PM
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Declarations of Brett Wayment, Devin Dehlin and Kasey Christensen is DENIED. Although the
Motion to Strike was filed in violation of Rule 7(n), the Court has considered the motion and finds it
without merit. The portions of declarations that were challenged are relevant and otherwise
admissible.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. There are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw. The Court considered a portion of Ryan Kartchner's deposition testimony, which was
relied upon by Plaintiff. Plaintiff objected to a clarification Mr. Kartchner made to this testimony,
arguing that while the clarification was technically timely, it was improper because it was made
after Plaintiff had filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court did not need to rule on
Plaintiffs objection, because the clarification did not alter the Court's decision. When Mr.
Kartchner was asked at his expert deposition, "[E]ven though that's your personal practice, do you
believe it is reasonable that Mr. Wayment believed he would be eligible to participate in the prize on
the hole sponsored by Nate Wade Subaru?", he responded, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable
[in some circumstances]." The Court finds that even with the addition of"in some circumstances,"
the answer is still definitive because the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mr. Kartchner
knew the circumstances of this situation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this is not a final judgment under Rule 54, and Plaintiff
shall submit a proposed Final Judgment and its memorandum of costs within 14 days of the date
hereof.
(Court's signature appears at the top of the first page of this document)
~

---END OF DOCUMENT---
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
/ , · ..- ,;,..~-, · • \
Dated: November 21, 2016
Isl PAIGE P·er-e~t{sp~ :
06:22:37 PM
Districf:.C9lirt'J_u~ge/

··... :. ~·:{:-':":. :: ~;,>•'

David M. Wahlquist (3349)
dwahlqu i(@,kmclaw.com
Adam D. Wahlquist (12269)
awah lguist@kmclaw.com
KIRTON I McCONKIE
Thanksgiving Park Four
2600 W. Executive Parkway, Suite 400
Lehi, UT 84043
Telephone: (801) 426-2100
Facsimile: (801) 426-2101
Attorneys for Plaintiff Brett Wayment

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

_____l_ _ -·

BRETT WAYMENT,

'

Plaintiff,

FINAL .JUDGMENT

Case No. 150905943

vs.

Judge Paige Peterson
SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company, dba NATE
WADE SUBARU,

Tier One

Defendant.

FINAL .JUDGMENT

Having granted Plaintiff BREIT WAYMENT' s Motion for Summary Judgment,
resolving the alternative claims pleaded in Plaintiffs Complaint, and having considered
Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Costs, the Court now enters its Final Judgment fully
resolving all claims and defenses between Plaintiff BREIT WAYMENT and Defendant
SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC, dba NATE WADE SUBARU as follows:
1.

Plaintiff BRETT WAYMENT is awarded $29,095.26 against Defendant
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SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LLC, dba NATE WADE
SUBARU, which consists of a principal award of$24,217, accrued
interest from June 1, 2015 to November 11, 2016 of$3,509.81 (i.e.,.
10 / 365 * 529 * $24,217), and costs in the amount of$1,368.45;.
2.

Plaintiff BRETT WAYMENT shall be entitled to post-judgment interest
hereafter incurred at the legal rate; and

3.

The Judgment herein is final for all purposes.

· (Court's signature appears at the top of the first page of this do~ument)
---END OF DOCUMENT--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of

Gw

the foregoing [Proposed] FINAL JUDGMENT to be served on the following by the method
indicated below:

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Email
(X) Via CM/ECF Filing

Mark 0. Morris
mmorris@swlaw.com
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 IO 1-1531

~

ls/Londa Heaton

6b

26093.2/
4811-3302-6108, v. 1
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Motion for Summary Judgment - September 30, 2016

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRENT WAYMENT,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 150905943

v.

SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC,
Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAIGE PETERSEN

SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
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Motion for Summary Judgment - September 30, 2016

1

APPEARANCES :

2

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

3

Adam D. Wahlquist

4

KIRTON MCKONKIE

5

Thanksgiving Point Four

6

2600 E. Executive Parkway, Suite 400

7

Lehi, Utah 84043

8
9

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

10

David M. Wahlquist

11

KIRTON MCKONKIE

12

Thanksgiving Point Four

13

2600 E. Executive Parkway, Suite 400

14

Lehi, Utah 84043

15
16

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

17

Mark O. Morris

18

SNELL

19

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200

20

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

&

WILMER, LLP

21
22

23
24
~
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Motion for Summary Judgment - September 30, 2016
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1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
HONORABLE PAIGE PETERSEN

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

4
5
6

7

THE COURT: We are here in case number 150905943. Let
me get everyone's appearances, please.
MR. WAHLQUIST:

David Wahlquist and Adam Wahlquist

for plaintiff Brent Wayment.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. MORRIS:

Okay.
Good morning, Your Honor. Mark Morris on

10

behalf of Nate Wade. This is Mr. Schneider who is the present

11

of Nate Wade.

12

THE COURT:

Okay. Great. Nice to have you all here

13

this morning. Okay. So, I have read all the briefing on this.

14

And first, why don't I look at the motion to strike? I agree

15

with plaintiffs. Under the current version of Rule 7, it's

16

technically supposed to be an objection within your memorandum

17

in opposition. I'll treat it as an objection. But I think all

18

of this information is relevant, so I am going to overrule the

19

objection and consider it. The extent that it should apply in

20

terms of the argument, is something that will be subject to

21

your argument. But I think it is relevant.

22

And I think in terms of Mr. Wayment's ability to

23

opine on what the standards are in the Utah golf industry, I

24

think it is based on his personal knowledge. It could be a lay

25

opinion that could come in. If this were in front of a jury, we
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

could talk about the complications of having the actual

2

plaintiff be designated as an expert. I'm not sure what would

3

happen with that. But in terms of a motion for summary

4

judgment, I'm comfortable that he's basing his opinions on his

5

own experience within the Utah golf industry and so I think

6

that there's a foundation for that. So, I'm going to overrule

7

the objection and I will consider all the information that's

8

been provided. All right?

9

10

So, let's have plaintiffs go first.
MR. WAHLQUIST:

Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate

11

Your Honor's time and attention in reading the materials. I'll

12

try not to be duplicative of what you have already spent time

13

attempting to digest. But I will--would like to summarize

14

initially some brief legal matters that I think are very

15

important to the determination of the motion and then a brief

16

recitation of the facts that are not in dispute. I think we can

17

focus in on one issue and then deal in detail with maybe what

18

that issue is if that would be okay. Feel free to interrupt me

19

if you would like at any time.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WAHLQUIST:

22

First, the legal principles that are in play today.

I'll ask questions where I need to.
Thank you, Your Honor.

23

Besides the law regarding motions for summary judgment, which I

24

won't spend any time on, the issue is whether there's any issue

25

of material fact that's been raised by admissible materials
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presented to Your Honor.

2

I think the first case that's of importance in this

3

is the Walters v. National Beverages Inc can that we cite,

4

which is a 1967 Utah Supreme Court case that we quote on page

5

12 of our brief, where the Court has said that they're in

6

accord with the general rule in this country that a prize

7

winning contest, such as at stake here, where an offer or

8

promise is made in exchange for an act to be performed on the

9

part of the contestant. The performance of that act is an

10

acceptance of the offer and results in a binding contract. We,

11

in Utah, don't have a hole-in-one golf case but--

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WAHLQUIST:

14

THE COURT:

15

This must be a frequent thing, I guess. I

MR. WAHLQUIST:

As we did--well, and I was surprised

as we looked at cases how often it was hole eight.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. WAHLQUIST:

20

I was, too.

don't know.

16
17

I was surprised there were so many.

Right.
And how often a car was what was at

stake.

21

THE COURT:

Right.

22

MR. WAHLQUIST:

I mean, you would not think there

23

would exist such similarities. But we have some cases in other

24

jurisdictions certainly that have the same kind of fact pattern

25

that we have here.
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1

The second principle that I think is important is the

2

one taken from the restatement second of contract section 29

3

that indicates that when an offer is made, that the terms of

4

the contract are determined by the manifested intention of the

5

offerer, not the subject intention, or whatever it is that he

6

or she intended to offer, but rather, what the manifestation

7

was to a reasonable person seeing the offer in the real world.

8
9

That particular rule was applied in the Cobaugh v.
Klick-Lewis case, which is one of those hole-in-one golf cases

10

that we had referenced. It comes out of the Supreme Court of

11

Pennsylvania in 1989. The court there said if an offerer knows

12

or has reason to know that he's creating an appearance of

13

assent, he may be bound by that appearance. And then, in that

14

case, they determined that a person reading the signs that were

15

there at that time would reasonably understand that he or she

16

would accept the offer and win the car performing the feat of

17

shooting a hole-in-one. And so regardless of what the offerer

18

intended--in that case, it was the manifestation to a

19

reasonable third party there as to what the offer was that

20

would be governing. And that's what the restatement states and

21

that's what the Cobaugh case followed. And that, we suggest, is

22

what the Utah Supreme Court would follow as well. And we're

23

looking at the manifest intention as perceived by reasonable

24

third parties in the position of Mr. Wayment in this case.

Qj)

25

THE COURT:

Let me ask you one question about that
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1

before we go on. So, with kind of dueling experts on both

2

sides, we have this issue of, well, any professional golfer in

3

Utah knows that you don't get to participate in a contest like

4

this. That's what defendants are saying. And then your expert

5

says well, that's not true. That's not consistent across the

6

board. Is this legal standard what a reasonable person would

7

view the terms of the offer to be, or a reasonable professional

8

golfer or a reasonable Utah professional golfer? What--or if

9

it's just a reasonable person who doesn't need to know the

10
11
12

standards of Utah professional golfers?
MR. WAHLQUIST:

The way I understand the test in this

case is it would be a person that is in Brent Wayment's shoes.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Okay.
A reasonable person in his shoes. So,

15

in this case, he had been a professional golfer and so I think

16

you have to assume that circumstance.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Okay.
I think you have to assume a person

19

who has had his experience in the State of Utah with

20

tournaments like this. And he shows up and in all of the

21

circumstances as to the--what manifestations are being given to

22

him, would a person in his position reasonably think he was

23

eligible to accept the offer.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Okay.
I think that's what we have to look
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at.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. WAHLQUIST:

I don't think you can just assume any

4

person, including one that's not a professional. I think it's

5

got to be one in his shoes.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

7

MR. WAHLQUIST:

\j

That same test, with respect to the

8

objective manifestation, as being the terms of the offer as

9

opposed to the subjective intent was followed by North Dakota

10

Supreme Court in that Harms v. Northland Ford Dealers case. You

11

might remember in the Cobaugh case, the offerer left the car

12

and the sign on the hole, and I think it was either number

13

eight or number nine. But it was two days after the tournament

14

that it was provided for was over, but he left the sign and the

15

car there. Somebody comes up in another tournament, sees it,

16

hits the hole-in-one and Pennsylvania Supreme Court said too

17

bad. A person in that golfer's position would have reasonably

18

understood that they could accept the offer. They didn't know

19

any different because the sign didn't say anything specific to

20

a tournament or a day or anything else.

21

Similarly, in the North Dakota Supreme Court case,

22

the lady who was golfing there, I guess Ms. Harms hit a hole-

23

in-one but she did it from the women's tees and the sponsor

24

said well it was our intent that anybody who got the hole-in-

25

one to receive the car would have to do so from the men's tees.
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1

But that wasn't communicated to anybody by anything. And the

2

Supreme Court said too bad. It's-- we look at what the manifest

3

intent is based on what a reasonable person would see. What are

4

the messages that person is receiving and would they have

5

reasonably thought they were an eligible offeree?

6

So, that's what we look at. And I wouldn't say Nate

7

Wade's intention in this case is totally irrelevant, because I

8

think it is probative of whether they intended to make an offer

9

at all. The conditions that they may have thought they were

10

intending to offer are not relevant unless they did something

11

to manifest those limitations to Mr. Wayment or anybody else

12

that would have been in his position.

13

THE COURT:

~

What about--and I'm not sure if this will

14

be the argument of Nate Wade, but in the memorandum in

15

opposition they're saying look Nate Wade didn't ever say that

16

this--we didn't say anything really. They're the rules that

17

maybe the competition printed up or the people at the golf

18

course and then there's the sign that says this is sponsored by

19

Nate Wade. And, yes, we drove up our car and it was parked by

20

the tee. But we provided our insurance to the people who were

21

sponsoring the tournament and if they failed to communicate

22

this, that's their problem and we shouldn't have to be

23

responsible because we knew all along we only were insured for

24

amateurs and we provided our insurance to the people running

25

the golf tournament and they should have made it clear. Does
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that matter who needed to make clear what any limitations were

2

in Nate Wade didn't really make signs or communicate anything

3

other than driving their car up there?

4

MR. WAHLQUIST:

I think the case law would suggest

5

it's the offerer's manifest intentions that govern. And so--and

6

you may input maybe some kind of an agency to the tournament

7

organizers as well. I don't know. But I think the tests--the

8

tests from the cases is the manifest intent as perceived by a

9

reasonable person going out there. The duty to communicate

10

limitations on what a reasonable person would perceive is upon

11

the person making the offer. So if Nate Wade failed to take

12

steps to make the limitations it's now claiming clear, they're

13

the ones that end up having to pay the price for that failure.

14

You know, the tournament sponsors certainly don't. Nate Wade

15

had an obligation to do that.

(f£D

16

'<iJ

But what's interesting too is if you look at--I'm not

17

sure--you've read the materials, so maybe it's in there. I

18

don't know whether they actually gave the insurance policy to

19

the Big Dream folks or not--

20

THE COURT:

Yeah.

21

MR. WAHLQUIST:

--but I don't think it's relevant

22

whether they did. That doesn't excuse them. This relationship

23

is--you know, the tournament organizers are kind of--if they're

24

involved at all, it's as agents of Nate Wade. The test is the

25

manifestation--the manifest terms as a reasonable person
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3

golfing there would have perceived at that tournament.
THE COURT:

So the two parties--the two players here

are the offerer and people competing in the tournament?

4

MR. WAHLQUIST:

5

THE COURT:

6

Who are saying okay, I'll take you up on

this chal 1 enge .

{i;J

7

MR. WAHLQUIST:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. WAHLQUIST:

10

That's correct.

That's correct.

Okay.
That's exactly how I see it.

The last legal principle I'd like to focus on before

11

we get into the facts, and then maybe drill down on the one

12

issue that you kind of alluded to when you're talking about

13

competing experts, is the rule that any ambiguity in the terms

14

of the offer being made, or the manifestation of the offer

15

being made, is construed against the offerer. And we have a

16

Utah case on that that we cite in our materials, the Jensen v.

17

Anderson case. The parties manifest intentions if there is an

18

ambiguity as to the manifest intentions. This ambiguity must be

19

construed against the offerer.

20

In the Harms case that we talked about earlier, the

21

North Dakota Supreme Court said the same thing. Whatever

22

ambiguity the offer contained should not be resolved against a

23

contestant. And then we cite to you another North Dakota case,

24

an earlier one from the Harms case, Groves v. Shamron Old Buick

25

Pontiac Inc, holding that ambiguous terms will be interpreted
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1

more strongly against the party who caused the ambiguity and

2

awarding in that case the golfer the value of the new car for

3

hitting the hole-in-one again. And it was in North Dakota. It

4

must be a good place to golf.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WAHLQUIST:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. WAHLQUIST:

9

Right.
And to get holes-in-one or something.

Seriously.
In any event, I think those are the

main--I think those are the principles at play here. Clearly,

10

the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that when an offer is

11

made up like that, someone who does the performance in response

12

to the offer accepts the offer, a binding contract is made. And

13

when--if there's a dispute over what the terms of the offer

14

are, that has got to be construed by looking at the manifest

15

terms as perceived in the eyes of a reasonable person trying to

16

accept the offer. And finally, that any ambiguities in those

17

terms have to be construed against the offerer making the

18

offer. They're the ones that are in control of the expectations

19

of people.

4i

20

I think it's kind of similar, a little bit, to the

21

(inaudible) 40 concept. You know, if you allow something to go

22

out in the marketplace and you allow an appearance to be done,

23

and somebody reacts to that or relies upon that, you know, the

24

party is held bound by that, even though there may not be

25

actual authority. I think it's the same kind of concept here.
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Whatever the manifest terms are.
So, to me, the issue here becomes whether a person in

3

Mr. Wayment's position, at that time at that tournament would

4

have reasonably believed that he was eligible to accept that

5

offer by hitting a hole-in-one.

6

There are a bunch of facts, and you've read through

7

them all. We apologize that a case for such a small amount has

8

got so much paper generated. But this is important to parties.

9

But there's some things that--some basic things that are not in

10

dispute that I think will help focus what the issue is. First,

11

it's undisputed that Nate Wade agreed with the tournament

12

sponsor that it would sponsor a hole-in-one tournament. I

13

realize in the papers there's some argument. I've used the

14

word--well, I won't use it then. I think that if Mr. Morris, my

15

good friend, were pushed, he would admit that Nate Wade

16

intended to offer a hole-in-one to somebody. It may not have

17

been Mr. Wayment, he claims, but to somebody. They agreed to

18

sponsor the hole.

Iii

19

They say now, after the fact, they went out and

20

procured insurance. Of course, the participants don't know

21

about that. They probably don't even know there is insurance.

22

But that's how these are done. And Nate Wade did that. Why did

23

they do that if they're not going to sponsor the tournament?

24

Then they drive a car out of their parking lot, take it over to

25

the tournament and it gets set on the eighth hole. Then, after
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1

somebody hits a hole-in-one, Nate Wade sends somebody there

2

that--Mr. Casting, the general sales manager, to congratulate

3

Mr. Wayment and to have his picture taken in front of the car

4

that he's supposed to get. So, you know, leaving aside the

5

professional issue, I think it's pretty clear they intended to

6

offer a car to somebody who might hit a hole-in-one on the

7

eighth hole. I don't think that can reasonably be disputed. No

8

reasonable fact finder could determine otherwise, I think, in

9

that regard. Since you're the reasonable fact finder here, I

10

guess you'll have to decide whether you agree with that or not.

11

It's also undisputed that there was a rule sheet that

12

was prepared by the organizer. It identifies, as most of these

13

tournaments do, they have some general rules and then they have

14

some places where you can get gifts or you can win prizes. This

15

one had it. You've seen it as one of the exhibits. I think it's

16

our Exhibit 1 to our materials. And it clearly says that on the

17

eighth hole of the Valley course it has a hole-in-one. There's

18

a hole-in-one prize. And then it goes on to list the other

19

holes that have prizes.

20

When--it's also undisputed that there was a sign that

21

the organizer put up on the eighth hole next to the car that

22

thanked Nate Wade for sponsoring that hole. And it's not an

23

exact agreement on what the content is. Although, we've got a

24

picture of it and everybody agrees to the picture, so I guess--

25

well, there's deposition testimony on various things. It is
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agreed that that was the sign. You know, it's there by the hole

2

by the car that everybody knows is a hole-in-one hole. And I

3

guess the issue is whether Mr. Wayment, as he approached that

4

hole would have reasonably thought that he was eligible to win

5

that car if he were to make a hole-in-one.

6

So, I think there are no material issues of fact,

7

except for that last one. Was it--possibly that last one. Was

8

he--did he reasonably believe--would a person in his position

9

reasonably believe that they were eligible to win that car by

10

hitting the hole-in-one? I don't think there's any question but

11

what if he were not a pro under the circumstances that Nate

12

Wade would agree that he reasonably thought he were eligible.

13

So the question becomes, then, does his pro status somehow--

14

because of his pro status, does that change what he should have

15

reasonably thought? It's undisputed that there were no express

16

limitations communicated to anybody by the offer or the

17

tournament organizers. It's not on the rule sheet where such

18

exclusions are usually found. It wasn't on the hole where

19

sometimes they're also found. Sometimes you find them in both

20

places. But no place had the information here. I think it's

21

undisputed there was no communication of any kind by either

22

Nate Wade Subaru or the tournament organizer that eligibility

23

on the eighth hole was limited to amateurs. You know, pros

24

could participate in this tournament. The prize sheet says what

25

it says. The sign says what it says. No exclusions. Nobody

~
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1

claims any oral communications of any kind that would suggest·

2

to anybody that there were communications. So the issue is left

3

with, as I see it, with Nate Wade Subaru's contention that

4

somehow a pro would automatically know because of practice in

5

the State of Utah that there would be an exclusion. And I guess

6

you need to decide what testimony is admissible and whether

7

that's sufficient to create an issue of fact. But I think

8

that's the bottom line as to what we're here about today.

9

I want to review, for just a minute, the evidence

10

that you have on that issue. And there's an evidentiary hearing

11

that will have to be resolved that's included in our materials

12

which is an objection to some changes to deposition testimony

13

and a declaration filed that is inconsistent with the

14

deposition testimony and without the requisite explanations

15

required by Utah law, all done in the face of our motion for

16

summary judgment. And you'll have to decide whether that's

17

admissible or not. If not, I think we clearly are entitled to

18

summary judgment. If you do admit them, then I guess we have a

19

discussion that we need to have about that on what that may be.

20

We have provided to you in our moving materials a

21

declaration of Brent Wayment himself. And I apologize--and this

22

is a reminder to me that I should check materials before they

23

go out because it's hard to find in these materials. If you go

24

behind tab one, which is our memorandum, we have an Exhibit F,

25

which is--excuse me, an Exhibit G, which is the
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declaration of Brent Wayment. Have you been able to locate

2

that?

3

THE COURT:

Yep, I've got it.

4

MR. WAHLQUIST:

You're faster than I was when I tried

5

to find it the first time. I wanted to just reflect on some of

6

what he has said because this is what we presented to you in

7

support of the issue that he--that a reasonable person in his

8

position would have believed that he was eligible to win the

9

prize where he had hit the hole-in-one on hole eight.

10

First, I would like to review paragraphs 3 through 9

11

and then 11 through 13. So he said I've had many years

12

experience--this probably should be putting on golf tournaments

13

i~cluding charity golf events. So, he's been both a sponsor and

14

a participant. Four, "many of these events included amateurs

15

and professionals." Five, "In those events, professionals and

16

amateurs alike were permitted to participate in prize contests

17

unless there are expressed limitations indicated on a rule

18

sheet and/or signs offering prizes. I have won and seen other

19

professionals win prizes at such events. On about June 1, 2015,

20

I participated in the Big League Dreams tournament posted at

21

Hidden Valley Country Club. I was part of a four man team that

22

participated in the tournament. Nothing on the rule sheet,

23

signs or other instructions indicated to me that the tournament

24

excluded me from participating in the event or its prize

25

contest because of my professional status." I think all that's
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important, his background for what his experience was, and the

2

context in which some person like him would approach this hole.

3

Then going over to paragraph 11, he says no

4

participant exclusion based on ability or status as a

5

professional golfer were communicated to participants before,

6

during or immediately following the event.

7

Then twelve, when I arrived at the eighth hole, I

8

understood that I could win a 2015 Subaru '15 Crosstrek from

9

Nate Wade Subaru if I made a hole-in-one.

10

Thirteen, I made a hole-in-one on the eighth hole.

11

So, while his subjective understanding may be--is not

12

dispositive, it's certainly probative of what a person in his

13

shoes and with his experience would have thought as he

14

approached this. So, the question becomes, you know, should he

15

have thought well I may not be eligible for this? His

16

experience as both the tournament sponsor and as a participant

17

was pros are always eligible unless the rule sheet and/or the

18

sign say they're not. And in this case, they weren't. So, as a

19

pro, he thought he was eligible.

20

So, that's Mr. Wayment's testimony, his experience.

21

Certainly if he had said I wondered when I approached this hole

22

if I were eligible because I was a pro and I thought I might

23

not be, that would be relevant and it may even be dispositive.

24

But in this case, he thought he was eligible, and

25

understandably so.
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But then we also provided to you the declaration on

2

Devin Dehlin, who's the executive director of the Utah section

3

of the PGA. Dehlin is found over in Exhibit M of Tab 1. I'll be

4

surprised if you find that one as fast as you did the other

5

one. I apologize again for not having that tabbed. Our legal

6

assistants are used to the filing requirements so they copied

7

these. They need to do different for courtesy copies I think.

8

Have you been able to locate that?

9

10
11
12

THE COURT:

Yep.

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Okay. I underestimated your

quickness. Sorry.
Mr. Dehlin indicates that's been a PGA professional

13

for 23 years in paragraph two. Three, he's played a number--in

14

an organized number of golf events. He's served as director of

15

golf for Salt Lake County. He's held professional positions, he

16

identifies in five. Currently, he was the executive director of

17

the Utah section of PGA. In paragraph seven, he says he's won

18

several awards. Then he gives some opinions. I don't want to

19

focus on all of his opinions. But some direct to this one issue

20

that we're discussing that, I'd like to focus on.

21

If we could go to his paragraph 15? He says some of

22

the same things Mr. Wayment said were his experience. Mr.

23

Dehlin says, "It is the custom and understanding of the Utah

24

golf industry that professional golfers are eligible to

25

participate in prizes contests such as hole-in-one contests
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unless the contest explicitly states otherwise." I think it's a

2

little ironic that what he doesn't say here is that

3

historically only professionals could win prizes. And that's

4

what distinguished a professional from an amateur is whether

5

you could win something. But that's kind of changed a little

6

bit. So, that's what he says in 15.

7

~

And if you go down to 16--well, let's go down to 17.

8

Excuse me. Sixteen is the basis for his opinion, I think on

9

four. And number five, opinion five in paragraph 17 says, "It

10

is custom and practice in the Utah golf industry for the event

11

organizers to communicate to event participants any limits on

12

their participation such as player status and limits." It gets

13

back to your question maybe earlier, he says it's customary for

14

the organizers to do it. Then he also says in paragraph 19 it

15

is custom and practice in the Utah golf industry for the prize

16

contest sponsors to expressly communicate to event participants

17

any limits, terms and conditions on the prize contest sponsors

18

such as player status and limitations. So that's his experience

19

and opinion.

20

If you go over to paragraph 21, he says, "The Big

21

League Dreams Foundation golf event was not an amateurs only

22

event as neither amateurs nor professionals were expressly

23

included or excluded in the event.

24
25

And if you go over to paragraph 25, his opinion
number eight, he says, "A professional golfer in Mr. Wayment's
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position would reasonably understand that the hole-in-one

2

contest of the June 1st, 2015 Big League Dreams Foundation golf

3

event included him."

4

So, we have both Mr. Wayment with his experience and,

5

getting back to the issue that you raised about plaintiff being

6

an expert maybe but certainly his subjective belief and also to

7

the extent he could qualify as an expert, his experience and

8

belief was that he was eligible. And you have Mr. Dehlin, an

9

independent person who certainly should be qualified as the

10

executive director of Utah section of PGA as to what a

11

professional would expect, who confirms that someone in Mr.

12

Wayment's position at that tournament, under the circumstances

13

that he's reviewed would believe that he were eligible to win

14

that prize were he to accomplish the feat of a hole-in-one.

15

At the time that we filed this motion, I had taken

16

the deposition of their expert witness, Mr. Kartchner. And but

17

for his testimony we probably wouldn't have filed this because

18

I would have thought maybe there was an issue of material fact.

19

But, and we quote his deposition testimony and it's attached in

20

two different places, I think in the papers that you have, but

21

the quote was important to us with respect to this particular

22

issue came at the very end of his deposition. In fact, when he

23

gave me the admission that he did, I thought we were through

24

with the discussion.

25

It's on page 10 of our memorandum under tab one.
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1

There are actually two quotes from a few pages apart there, and

2

the first one is less important in my mind. I was just asking

3

whether, you know, he thought Mr. Dehlin's opinions were

4

reasonable even though in some respects they may have differed

5

from his own. He said yeah that he thought they were

6

reasonable.

7

But the important one is the next one. After some

8

discussion in the deposition of what Mr. Kartchner would do

9

personally if he were to win a prize or the things that he

10

might think he would do, I asked him this question. Again, this

11

is the very last thing I asked him in his deposition because I

12

thought it was the nut of the whole thing. And I say, "Even

13

though it's your personal practice, do you believe it is

14

reasonable that Mr. Wayment believed he would be eligible to

15

participate in the prize on the hole sponsored by Nate Wade

16

Subaru?" I think that's the ultimate question here. And he said

17

unequivocally, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable. 11

18

Now, in their papers, Mr. Morris takes some issue

19

with me, saying, you know, why didn't you go on and ask him why

20

it wouldn't be reasonable--why it would be reasonable. You

21

know, were there circumstances where it wouldn't be reasonable.

22

Well, I suggest the case law says that was his job if he didn't

23

like the answer. He didn't do that. This was the last thing

24

that Mr. Kartchner said when I took his deposition.

25

So, we're sitting in our office and we're saying do
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1

we go to trial on this, or do we file a motion for summary

2

judgment? And it's a small dollar case. So, we're very

3

sensitive to time costs on this. Their expert has just told us

4

that he believes that Mr. Wayment, someone in his position

5

would reasonably have thought he were eligible for the prize.

6

Closed and shut. We file our motion for summary judgment.

7

And, of course, we put this to you and say this is

8

what he said. So, now not only do we have Mr. Wayment with his

9

experience and his testimony and his, you know, subjective at

10

least and maybe expert opinion based on his experience as to

11

what he thought as he approached that hole. We've got Mr.

12

Dehlin saying a person in Mr. Wayment's position would have

13

reasonably thought that he were eligible. And now we have their

14

own expert who, despite his prior expert report, which I'm now

15

working against, admits that Mr. Wayment--that he would believe

16

that Mr. Wayment could have reasonably thought that he was

17

eligible for that. I don't see any issue of material fact

18

remaining.

19

But then something happens. And what happens is after

20

this is done--remember, we have a deadline. The rules say 28

21

days after the close of discovery, your dispositive motion is

22

due. On the very last day of the deadline, we file this motion.

23

So, although the 28 days was expiring, so we have to file, the

24

30 days for changing deposition testimony, for clarifying

25

deposition testimony had not expired. They still had a couple
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of days left. So, after receiving this document, they then

2

undertake to change two pages, two answers, from Mr.

3

Kartchner's deposition. And what are they? The very two we

4

quote in paragraph 32 of our brief. It's the only thing that

5

changes.

6

And he changes them by making--on paragraph 32 where

7

it says, "Even though you disagree with Mr. Dehlin's opinions

8

in some respects, do you consider his opinions to be

9

reasonable?" The answer was an unequivocal yes. They insert the

10

word, "Some of them." The words, "Some of them." So, "Yes, some

11

of them are reasonable." Of course, I didn't have that when I

12

took his deposition so I don't get to follow up on that.

13

The more significant one is the second one where he

14

unequivocally said, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable."

15

They put a comma and said "In some circumstances." Well- -and

16

then they criticize me in their papers for not following up in

17

the deposition about what those circumstances were even though

18

the answer did not suggest there were any circumstances wherein

19

it would be unreasonable. It was not a qualified admission in

20

his deposition.

21

So, I question--and then they do a second thing. They

22

file a declaration. And we can look at that in a minute. It's

23

in their opposition paper. But they file a declaration from Mr.

24

Dehlin where all he says--it was very, very short. Or, excuse

25

me, Mr. Kartchner, of their expert, and all he says is--it
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1

doesn't go back and explain why he changed his deposition

2

testimony, nor does he explain why his short little declaration

3

is different from his deposition testimony. He simply says I

4

adopt Mr. Morris' description summary of what my testimony's

5

going to be as my testimony, and it's accurate. And so from

6

that, they hope to create a material issue of fact. At the time

7

we filed, there clearly was none. Their expert agreed.

8
9

So the question that now gets--as we drill down, that

I think you are faced with, is Mr. Kartchner allowed at this

10

point to come in and change his deposition testimony

11

substantially to create an issue of fact in the face of a

12

summary judgment. He quotes the very language, which he

13

changed--which he subsequently changed.

14

And does Utah law allow him to put up a declaration

15

that suggests, even though you kind of have to weave through it

16

to get there, that his opinion is different from what he said

17

when I took his deposition, without providing any explanation

18

as to why? Utah law does allow under some circumstances some

19

changes if you can come in and explain to the Court a generally

20

reliable explanation as to why you were in error and how you're

21

fixing it. We don't have any of that.

22

~

So, I would like to take a look at some of the law

23

that addresses that right now because I think that's a

24

preliminary issue that this Court needs to resolve. And then I

25

guess you need to resolve that even if you let it in, does it
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1

make a difference? Does it create a genuine issue of material

2

fact?
We have a case that gives us some help on changes to

3

4

deposition testimony. And this the Albright v. Bennett case

5

that we quote on page 10 of our reply brief. It's a 2002 case

6

from our Court of Appeals. It talks about changes that can be

7

made under Rule 30, you know, when one is reviewing deposition

8

transcript. And while it allows clarifications, it doesn't

9

allow (inaudible), which is what this change did. It took an

10

unequivocal answer, put a clout on it that they now hope will

11

be sufficient to raise an issue of material fact. But in the

12

Albright case, our appellate court said, "Rule 3 0 cannot be

13

interpreted to allow one to alter what was said under oath. If

14

that were the case, one could merely answer the questions with

15

no thought at all and then return home and plan artful

16

responses. Depositions differ from interrogatories in that

17

record. A deposition is not a take home examination."

18

Changes to a deposition are not permitted if they

19

alter what was said under oath, if they introduce new and

20

additional testimony, and if they do revise and correct

21

information or make minor changes. In this case, the line has

22

been crossed. Not only has this not been a clarification, it's

23

a change of an unequivocal answer to one that creates some

24

ambiguity.

25

And certainly, if it had been given at the time of
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1

the deposition, I would have immediately followed up with well,

2

what are those circumstances? Explain to me what you mean. But

3

having got the one point I took the whole deposition for, I

4

quit at that point in time. I think it would have been foolish

5

to go on and generate more deposition testimony when I had an

6

unequivocal answer to the one potential issue in this case.

7

That kind of a change should not be allowed. They shouldn't

8

have been allowed to say- - add the words "under some

9

circumstances" after he said unequivocally, "Yes, I believe it

10
11

would be reasonable."
Now, while we're here, I guess, I pose the question

12

to you, Your Honor, and you're the one of course making the

13

decision, but we have the burden to come forward with a fact or

14

assert a fact and to support it by evidence. We did that. We

15

gave you Mr. Wayment's declaration. We gave you Mr. Dehlin's

16

expert declaration. That said, then, a person in Mr. Wayment's

17

position would have reasonably expected they were eligible for

18

this prize. They then have the burden to provide citations from

19

the record that would refute that. Even if you allow them to

20

amend Mr. Kartchner's deposition testimony to say yes I believe

21

it would be reasonable under some circumstances, is that enough

22

to refute it? He doesn't go forward and say in these

23

circumstances, I don't think it's reasonable. So, after they

24

really raised it, even if you allow them to do it, I suggest

25

maybe they haven't. And clearly, if you don't allow it. And I
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1

don't think that the Court should allow it. Under Rule 30 it's

2

not acceptable, under the Albright case it's not acceptable,

3

clearly if you don't allow it, they haven't raised an issue of

4

fact. They haven't provided any evidence to create an issue of

5

fact.

6

The next thing has to deal with, you know, did they

7

have the opportunity to come in and file a declaration that's

8

in contrast to the deposition testimony? Well, the case on

9

point here is the Utah Supreme Court's 1998 pronouncement in

10

Harnishner, I hope that's how you say that, versus the

11

University of Utah Medical Center. That's cited on page nine of

12

our brief. And the Court said, the general rule is that in a

13

summary judgment proceeding, when a party takes a clear

14

position in a deposition that is not modified on cross-

15

examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue by his own

16

affidavit, which contradicts his deposition unless he can

17

provide an explanation of the discrepancy.

18

That's done generally in the declaration where you're

19

taking the contrary position. You have to explain why you were

20

in error before and why the Court should believe your change in

21

testimony. Well, we don't have that here. We have the

22

declaration. We have no explanation as to why the change in the

23

testimony. And under Harnishner, that declaration is not

24

admissible to contradict the terms of his affidavit--of his

25

deposition testimony made under oath. You can't just come in
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and do it, and that's what he's purporting to do here.

2

So, I suggest to Your Honor there is no admissible

3

evidence from their side that raises an issue of material fact

4

on what a person in Mr. Wayment's shoes would reasonably have

5

anticipated. Although there was an expert report that took the

6

position, I deposed the expert and he said what you saw him

7

say. And he said he was acting--a person could have reasonably

8

thought that he was eligible, and if he were in Mr. Wayment's

9

shoes that morning on June 1, 2015, when he did the incredible

10

feat of a hole-in-one on hole eight. And having failed then to

11

present to you any admissible evidence to raise an issue of

12

material fact regarding that point, we'd suggest to Your Honor

13

that we're entitled to summary judgment and we ought to get the

14

value of that car. We're probably entitled to the car itself,

15

but I think they sold it. So, we have an admission as to what

16

its value is and that's what we're seeking for on the summary

17

judgment.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. WAHLQUIST:

~

All right.
~

Thank you for being patient and

20

listening to me go through all of that, but that is our

21

position. That's what I think the issue is. I think we're

22

entitled to what we are asking you for on the basis of the

23

discussion we had. Do you have any questions that you have that

24

I haven't addressed?

25

THE COURT:

I don't think so. I think you've answered
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1
2

3

all of them.
MR. WAHLQUIST:

And probably more--a few more that

you didn't want answered.

4

THE COURT:

It was very helpful. So, no, thank you.

5

MR. WAHLQUIST:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. MORRIS:

Thank you very much.

Thanks a lot.
Your Honor, let me just inquire, I don't

8

know that the Court anticipated plaintiff taking the entire

9

hour for their argument.

10

THE COURT:

You're fine.

11

MR. MORRIS:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MORRIS:

14

May it please the Court, my name is Mark Morris. I

We're okay to proceed now?
You're good.
Okay. Thank you.

15

represent Nate Wade Subaru. I'm happy to address all the expert

16

issues and the testimony issues that Mr. Wahlquist devoted many

17

the most vigorous part of his argument to, but you don't need

18

to go there because there was no offer made to Mr. Wayment to

19

give him a car if he made a hole-in-one.

20

When Mr. Wahlquist returns to the podium, the Court

21

can ask him one question. Where in the 200 pages of evidence

22

they submitted to the Court is there anything that says if you

23

make a hole-in-one on this hole you get a car? Where is it? It

24

does not exist. And because that offer was not made, summary

25

judgment is inappropriate. And, in fact, it ought to be denied
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1

with prejudice because discovery's over. If they had something,

2

anything, on Nate Wade letterhead or that was authorized by

3

Nate Wade to say if anyone hits a hole-in-one on this hole, you

4

get a car, then they were obligated to bring it forth now. And

5

they did not because it does not exist.

6

7

THE COURT: So, let me make sure I understand your
position on this.

8

MR. MORRIS:

9

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
Are you now--I think the specific way

10

that Mr. Wahlquist said it was it's not disputed that Nate Wade

11

was offering a car to someone who hit a hole-in-one. If someone

12

hits a hole-in-one, Nate Wade will give you this Crosstrek. Are

13

you disputing that?

14

MR. MORRIS:

Yes. Anyone, yes. Someone, no. Because

15

when they deposed Mr. Schneider, they said, "What were the

16

terms of this offer?" And Mr. Schneider was very clear. And

17

they cited to it in the moving papers. Yes, we agree to give a

18

car to an amateur who plays on the same--on the right day and

19

from the correct tees. You can't go up, drop the ball three

20

feet from the hole and call it a hole-in-one. That would be a

21

hole-in-one, but it wouldn't be in accordance with the

22

conditions that were not expressed on the tee box. Nothing on

23

the tee box said you've got to use a particular tee to hit your

24

ball from. It's in the rule sheet that Mr.--that Nate Wade

25

didn't put out.
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Here's the offer. If an amateur hits a ball, a hole-

2

in-one, on hole number eight, on that day in that tournament,

3

he wins a car.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. MORRIS:

So, where is that offer made?
Exactly. Exactly. Where is that offer

6

made? It's made when Mr. Schneider sends to the golf course the

7

insurance form. Because the insurance company wants to know

8

what the yardage is. Is this a long hole? Is it a short one?

9

And they're going to adjust the premiums accordingly. And the

10

very critical question on that insurance form is are there any

11

pros playing in this event? And Mr. Schneider sent it out, did

12

not check the pro box, and said here's my insurance form,

13

here's the offer I'm making. I'm not offering this to pros, but

14

it's anyone else, an amateur, that hits from the correct tees

15

on that day in this tournament. That was the offer.
THE COURT:

16
17

that communicated to?

18

MR. MORRIS:

And that offer was made to whom? Who was

Well, that's the irony here, Your Honor.

19

It wasn't communicated to anyone. See, they want the benefit of

20

part of the offer being made, a car, hole-in-one, and they stop

21

there. But that offer wasn't communicated to anyone either. It

22

was a--

23

THE COURT:

Do you disagree that it seems that people

24

thought a car was going to be given for a hole-in-one? And

25

plaintiffs have a lot of circumstantial evidence of that.
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There's a car sitting there by the tee box. There's the Nate

2

Wade sponsored this. There's the rule sheet that says hole-in-

3

one. It doesn't say wins a car. It just says hole-in-one. And

4

then, when he makes the hole-in-one, he thinks he's going to

5

win a car and it seems that Nate Wade thinks he's going to win

6

the car. Until they find out he's a professional.

7

MR. MORRIS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Precisely.
So, it seems like Nate Wade thought a car

was being offered for a hole-in-one.

10

MR. MORRIS:

No dispute. No dispute. Let's be clear,

11

if an amateur goes up and makes a hole-in-one, Nate Wade owes a

12

car. Period. But your question is the very one that answers

13

this motion. Well, how was that communicated to the

14

participants? Well, it was not. And we can go through the rule

15

sheet and everything that Mr. Wayment saw that day. And nothing

16

that he saw that day told him he was going to win a car.

17

Nothing.

18
19

THE COURT:

Did it tell the amateurs they were going

to win a car?

20

MR. MORRIS:

21

THE COURT:

Not in so many words.
So, if they were going to win a car, how

22

are they supposed to know that it's only amateurs and not

23

professionals; that the amateurs were right, the professionals

24

were wrong, but it's just a guess because nothing that any of

25

them were shown or communicated to them gave that distinction?
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1

They wouldn't know, Your Honor, and

2

that's the problem here. Because the offer wasn't really

3

communicated to anyone. Nate Wade was certainly willing to

4

honor its commitment to the tournament, that if an amateur hits

5

a hole-in-one that we'll give them a car. But for everyone

6

stepping up on that tee box, what have they seen? They see a

7

rule sheet that doesn't mention a prize, doesn't mention a car,

8

and doesn't mention Nate Wade. Just hole number eight, hole-in-

9

one. Not a contest, not a prize, not a car, not Nate Wade.

10
11
~

MR. MORRIS:

Nothing. Okay.
Well, it looks like there's something going on on

12

hole number eight. And they get up there and there's a car. And

13

there is a sign, not that Nate Wade put there, but that the

14

tournament put thanking Nate Wade for sponsoring the

15

tournament. Period.

16

Now, there's an interesting factual thing going on

17

with declarations here too that I need to point out. If you

18

look at the complaint--may I approach, Your Honor?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MORRIS:

Yes.
If you look at the complaint, paragraph

21

nine says this when he arrived at the eighth hole Mr. Wayment

22

saw the Nate Wade Subaru sign, okay, and reasonably understood

23

he could win a car if he hit a hole-in-one. No mention of any

24

other sign, just the Nate Wade--thanking Nate Wade sign is

25

really what it is, that the tournament put there. And then a
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1
2

Subaru sitting on the tee box.
When I deposed Mr. Wayment, I said did you see

3

anything else on the tee box? Yes. Well, what did you see? I

4

saw a sign promising a car to anyone that hits a hole-in-one.

5

That was his testimony. Well, what color was the sign? Oh, I

6

don't remember. What was the wording? I don't remember exactly

7

but it said if you hit a hole-in-one, you win a car. That was a

8

surprise to me and everyone else because the two--two of the

9

three of the playing partners he was with don't remember that

10

sign. The pro shop who sent people down to set up signage

11

didn't put that sign there. And no one from Nate Wade put a

12

sign there. No one from the tournament put a sign there saying

13

you get a car if you hit a hole-in-one.

14

(vi

And now, Your Honor, the most interesting thing

15

that's occurred is, speaking of declarations after the fact, if

16

you look at Exhibit G, you had it up there before, look at

17

paragraph 10. This was Mr. Wayment's declaration that he filed

18

six months after his deposition when he claimed there was a

19

sign that promised him a car if he got a hole-in-one. And now,

20

in paragraph 10, he says this: "From the rule sheet, which

21

indicated a hole-in-one contest on the eighth hole, the car on

22

the tee, and the logo, the Nate Wade Subaru logo, I understood

23

defendant Nate Wade Subaru was sponsoring the eighth hole and

24

offering a car to anyone that made a hole-in-one."

25

IJ

It's fascinating to me, Your Honor, that now
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1

apparently he's backing off of his sworn deposition testimony

2

where he tried to guild the lily and claim there was a hole-in-

3

one sign on the tee box, and his most recent sworn statement

4

now backs off of that sworn testimony he gave me in December of

5

2015.
Now, their case, the anethum they're singing to you

6

7

today is there was nothing excluding professionals from this

8

contest. Well, Your Honor, there was nothing including him

9

either because there were no terms. There was no offer. There

10

was nothing promising anyone anything. Is Nate Wade going to

11

stand behind its commitment to the tournament, to give an

12

amateur a car if they hit a hole-in-one? Absolutely. That offer

13

was made. But as for people who step up on the tee, who see a

14

rule sheet that doesn't promise a car, doesn't mention a prize,

15

doesn't mention Nate Wade, you get on the tee box, well this

16

hole's being sponsored by Nate Wade and there's a car. Well,

17

what else are they going to put on the tee box? But, you know,

18

Nate Wade could have been offering a golf bag. A sleeve of

19

balls with the Subaru logo on them. I mean, what was the prize?

20

Nothing. Nothing told anyone what the prize was except what

21

Nate Wade promised the tournament it would provide when it said

22

okay I'm getting insurance. Here are my conditions to give away

23

a car.

24

25

THE COURT:

So, you're saying the agreement was

between Nate Wade and the tournament, but not any of the
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1
2

3

tournament participants?
MR. MORRIS:

There was an agreement between Nate Wade

and the tournament. Yes, there was.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. MORRIS:

But not to the participants?
Anyone stepping up on the tee didn't

6

know what the prize was going to be, didn't know who was

7

eligible, and teed off and hoped they got a hole-in-one.

8

Nothing told the participants what they were going to get.

9

THE COURT:

How did they know then? Because it seems

10

like they did know they were going to get a car. And they were

11

right because the car was the prize.

12

MR. MORRIS:

The car was the prize. But--exactly,

13

Your Honor. How did they know? How did they know? They didn't.

14

And all of this language about what's--you know, manifestation

15

versus subjective intent, Mr. Wahlquist made a big deal about

16

that, that what you subjectively intend doesn't matter. It's

17

what you manifest. Well, what was manifested? What was

18

manifested? Nothing in the rule sheet was manifested other than

19

an eighth hole hole-in-one. It doesn't even say contest. It

20

doesn't even say prize. Nate Wade manifested nothing except

21

parking a car for promotional purposes. I mean, it's not going

22

to put anything else there because it's a car dealership, to

23

promote its business. But it didn't promise a car to anyone

24

that hits a hole-in-one. It promised the tournament it would

25

provide a car to an amateur who hit a hole-in-one and gave the
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1

tournament ample notice of the fact that we're not insuring.

2

We're not getting insurance for anyone else. We don't intend.

3

So that was their subjective intent. But go to the other side.

4

Where was the manifestation of an intent to give anyone hitting

5

a hole-in-one a car?

6

THE COURT:

So, isn't your issue with the tournament

7

for not communicating to the participants that it was only for

8

amateurs? Because if Nate Wade gave this information to the

9

tournament and said here's what we're willing to do, and then

10

from the appearances on the day of with the rule sheet saying

11

hole-in-one in one, where it's listing all of the individual

12

contests that are going to be on different holes. It says hole-

13

in-one on hole eight. And then there's a car parked there and

14

it's sponsored by Nate Wade, and people think that they're

15

going to win the car if they get the hole-in-one. Isn't it--

16

isn't your problem with the tournament for not communicating

17

clearly that it was only for amateurs?

18

MR. MORRIS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MORRIS:

No.
If that's what you told the tournament.
In hindsight, would it have been

21

terrific if--may have done that, sure. But look at the rule

22

sheet. Look at--it's Exhibit 1 to Exhibit G. If you're still on

23

G, just go to the Exhibit 1 to that.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. MORRIS:

Okay.

~

So 2015, Big League Dreams Foundation
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1

golf tournament.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MORRIS:

Okay.
The longest drive contest; what's the

4

prize for that? Hole-in-one; what's the prize for that? Longest

5

put; what's the prize for that? Closest to the pin on seven;

6

gee, what are you going to get for that? Nothing in this rule

7

sheet tells anyone what they were going to get. And so no one

8

playing golf that day--I mean, so let's say someone wins the

9

longest drive and they go in and they say where's my set of

10

irons? And they go oh, I'm sorry, the longest drive contest was

11

just one club, a driver. Well, I expected a set of irons. I

12

mean, that kind of ambiguity just can't lead to tell someone

13

you've got to give someone a car. And this is not an ambiguity

14

that Mr. Wahlquist says should be construed against the

15

dealership because, Your Honor, you have to have terms in order

16

to have an ambiguity. If Nate Wade had posted the sign on the

17

tee box saying we will give a car to anyone hitting a hole-in-

18

one today in this tournament, I don't know what ambiguities

19

there would be. They didn't do that. So, this business about

20

construing ambiguities, there were no terms.

21

Mr. Wayment and the other people in that tournament

22

stepped up on the tee box and they saw no terms, no offer,

23

there was nothing in the rule sheet telling them they would get

24

a car. And so, it's not a question of whether what Nate did was

25

ambiguous. There's no question here factually because Nate Wade
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1

did nothing. Didn't convey any terms. And so ambiguity is an

2

irrelevant inquiry at that point.

3

I've gone through paragraph 10 on Exhibit G. Let me

4

talk about the law a little bit because I didn't hear anything

5

about contracts this morning. They're trying to enforce a

6

contract. Their claim is a breach of contract and promissory

7

estoppel. Those are their two claims. Promissory estoppel is

8

clearly out the window because there's no evidence of any

9

promise being made except to the tournament. And--but this is a

10

contract case. And we cited the Court to the cases involving

11

unilateral contract and offers and acceptance.

12

The Richard Barton case is fundamental. The meeting

13

of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is

14

essential to the formation of a contract. Clearly, no meeting

15

of the minds here. The Republic Group, Inc, case, Utah Court of

16

Appeals from '94, this meeting of the minds must be spelled out

17

either expressly or implicitly with sufficient detail to be

18

enforced. There's no detail anywhere here. A car, a sign, a

19

rule sheet that says nothing about a contest, prize, Nate Wade

20

or a car. In Utah, this is the (inaudible) case, "For an

21

implied in fact contract term to exist, it must meet the

22

requirements of an offer of a unilateral contract. There must

23

be a manifestation of the offerer's intent that is communicated

24

to the offeree and sufficiently definite to operate as a

25

contract provision." We all agree, Nate Wade never talked to

~
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Mr. Wayment before he teed off.

2

The intent here was, tournament, we'll give a car to

3

any amateur that hits a hole-in-one. That was the contract at

4

issue. And Mr. Wayment didn't have a deal, any more than anyone

5

else teeing off, on any of the prize holes that day had a deal.

6

Because they weren't told, none of them, what they were going

7

to win. None. The rule sheet was silent on that for all the

8

contests.

9

10

You know, car dealers--may I inquire if you play
golf, Your Honor?

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. MORRIS:

I don't.
Okay. You know, sometimes you get up and

13

you get to win a car and you get to drive it for a year. Even

14

Mr. Wayment I'm sure would agree to that. In many of these

15

contests, the dealership will say here's a one year lease.

16

Here's a two-year lease. Drive our car for a year. You know, a

17

car sitting on a tee box doesn't translate to ownership of a

18

$24,000, $25,000 car. It can imply a lot of things, none of

19

which were expressed here. And so it's not, as a matter of law,

20

reasonable to say I'm entitled to a car even though nothing

21

promised me a car. Nothing.

22

The Pennsylvania case, these other cases that they

23

cited to you, I just want to briefly call your attention to the

24

fact that, yeah, if someone makes public the conditions and

25

rules of a contest, you've got to be held to it. Well, the
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1

terms here were not public. The Harms case out of South Dakota,

2

do you know what the court focused on there? Quote, "The

3

promulgated contest rules in determining that the defendant

4

quote must abide by the rules in announced, not by the ones it

5

left unannounced. Well, in that case there were announced terms

6

and conditions and rules. And the court said I don't care what

7

your subjective intent was, you're hung by what you put out

8

there for the public. The problem in this case is the only

9

thing Nate Wade put out to the public was driving a car to the

10

tee box, and that's not enough as a matter of law.

11

Now, the Walters National Beverages case, going back

12

to 1967, you know, there, interestingly, the Supreme Court

13

disagreed with the plaintiff in that case, saying that the

14

defendant's offer was not subject to the plaintiff's subjective

15

interpretation. Rather, we're going to stick the offerer with

16

the terms that he put out on his offer. The plaintiff there was

17

trying to get the Court to vary from what was the contest

18

there. And the Court said no, no, no, your subjective intent

19

doesn't matter. Whatever they put out, we're going to make them

20

stick to it. Well, the only thing Nate Wade put out here was

21

the communication to the tournament that we'll give a car to

22

any amateur that makes a whole-in-one from the right tees on

23

that day.

24

25

So, let's follow Mr. Wayment around briefly and see
if this reasonable belief business gets us anywhere. Mr.
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1

Wayment shows up to the golf course. There's nothing in the

2

parking lot telling him he gets a car. He goes and hops in his

3

cart and he sees a rules sheet. Nothing in the rules sheet

4

tells him he's going to get a car. The registration form, and

5

that is Exhibit E to their moving papers. And frankly, I'm not

6

even sure Mr. Wayment even saw this. But the registration form

7

that each foursome had to fill out doesn't say anything about

8

contests. It just says give us the names of your players and

9

who's sponsoring this foursome. So, the registration form, it's

10
11

in evidence, but it says nothing about a contest.
Mr. Wayment hops on his golf cart and sees a rules

12

sheet and he goes wow look at all these contests. I don't know

13

what the prizes are. The rule sheet didn't tell him. No one

14

orally told him, I think we all agree, that a car was going to

15

be offered to him. And so he gets out there to hole number

16

eight and he sees a car and he sees a tournament sign thanking

17

Nate Wade for sponsoring the hole. But he doesn't know what the

18

prize is. He can guess. He can assume. He can say wow I wonder

19

if I'm going to get that car. Or maybe I get to drive it for a

20

month, a year, two years. Don't know. The offer wasn't there.

21

There's no terms to stick down Nate Wade's throat here.

22

And so it's undisputed, Your Honor, undisputed that

23

Nate Wade never put a sign on that tee box promising a car. The

24

tournament never put a sign on that tee box promising a car.

25

The tournament never did anything in writing promising anyone a
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS

801-285-9495 / thackertranscripts@gmail.com
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00737

i)

(.j

Motion for Summary Judgment - September 30, 2016
44
1

car. The pro shop guys that went out and helped the tournament

2

set things up, undisputed, the pro shop never put up a sign and

3

did anything there. The only reason I wasn't filing a motion

4

for summary judgment on the same day that Mr. Wahlquist did is

5

because Mr. Wayment said in his deposition he saw a sign

6

promising him a car. To me, that created an issue of fact and I

7

said well I guess we're going to trial.

8
9

Little did I know, after they file their motion for
summary judgment and he files his declaration in June is he

10

backing off of that completely unsupportable claim. That even

11

guys in his own foursome disagree with. They didn't see a sign

12

promising a car to anyone hitting a hole-in-one.

13

So, Your Honor, this Court doesn't have to worry

14

about Mr. Kartchner's deposition and the declarations and this

15

whole reasonable pro business. You never have to get there if

16

there was no offer made to Mr. Wayment as a professional to get

17

a car if he hits a hole-in-one. That's a matter of--no issue of

18

fact on that in terms--well, I don't know what the Court's

19

going to do with the fact that he testified in his deposition

20

there was a sign and now his declaration doesn't say there

21

wasn't one but he sure--you sure would think he would mention

22

that sign in his declaration supporting this motion if in truth

23

there were one .

24

Let me just briefly hit on Mr. Kartchner's deposition

25

on Mr. Kartchner's deposition and the gotcha that Mr. Wahlquist
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thought he got at the end of the deposition. Look at the

2

question. Mr. Kartchner, was it reasonable for Mr. Wayment to

3

believe he was going to get a car on that day? Now, Mr.

4

Wahlquist didn't mention two things that are really important

5

here. First, I objected to the question. I gave Mr. Wahlquist

6

an opportunity to fix his question. And I objected and I

7

pointed out that's an incomplete hypothetical. Is it reasonable

8

for Mr. Wayment to assume this? Given what? And I pointed out

9

then, I said if that's a hypothetical, then fill in the facts,

10

Mr. Wahlquist.

11

It wasn't reasonable under what circumstances because

12

he didn't mention any. And the critical thing here. Because Mr.

13

Wahlquist characters the response as an unqualified admission.

14

Now, an unqualified admission to was it a reasonable question

15

would be yes. But he qualified it because he went on. He said

16

yes, it would be reasonable. And Mr. Wahlquist made the

17

election, thinking he got his gold, to say no more questions.

18

That's not an unqualified answer. Yes, it would be reasonable.

19

Well, Mr. Wahlquist didn't want to find out what the answer

20

was.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MORRIS:

23
24

What's Mr. Kartchner's position again?
He is the head professional out at

Hidden Valley.
THE COURT:

So, was he involved in the tournament?
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MR. MORRIS:

1
2
~

3
4

5

Yes. Well, the tournament was at his

course.
THE COURT:

So, wouldn't he know the circumstances of

this tournament?
MR. MORRIS:

Number one, he wouldn't know. He

6

wouldn't have read Mr. Wayment's deposition, for example. I

7

mean, is it reasonable for X person to believe something?

8

That's a naked question. It's a--because it's uniformed by any

9

other facts. How does Mr. Kartchner get into Mr. Wayment's

10

head? He doesn't know--you know, for all we know, Mr. Wayment

11

had talked to Mr. Schneider two days before and Mr. Schneider

12

had said, Brent, if you make a hole-in-one, I'm giving you the

13

car. We don't know what assumptions Mr. Kartchner made about

14

Mr. Wayment's state of mind. It was not an unqualified answer.

15

And it certainly wasn't a change in the answer. Because this is

16

not a red light suddenly becoming a green light. This is, yes,

17

it would be reasonable. He stopped. Mr. Wahlquist didn't

18

inquire further, well, under what circumstances would it have

19

been reasonable, Mr. Kartchner, and Mr. Kartchner could have

20

explained. That didn't happen. So, to say, yes, it would be

21

reasonable and just go on and say in certain circumstances, it

22

was not incumbent upon him. And, you know, this was not--this

23

is Mr. Kartchner changing his deposition testimony.

24

The other thing that Mr. Wahlquist did not mention

25

was--but it's in our opposition, was my email to him and the
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other Mr. Wahlquist saying guys Mr. Kartchner's only had his

2

deposition for two weeks. I'll give you an opportunity to

3

withdraw your motion and once you have given him his statutory

4

right to clarify his deposition testimony, you can re-file if

5

you want to. I made that offer and I was greeted with silence.

6

They may have been under the gun and they may have thought they

7

had to file in the last day because the rules say you've got to

8

do it within 28 days at the end of fact discovery. They know

9

I'm not a hard guy. I mean, we can certainly agree to extend

10

that to allow a witness to do what the rules say the witness is

11

entitled to do. But they did not.

12

You know, all of that is--would be a terrific law

13

review article or maybe even a bar question about this whole

14

interplay between declarations and depositions and was it

15

incumbent on Mr. Wahlquist to follow up? Or was I supposed to

16

interject? After I had my objection and pointed out to him the

17

problem with his question and he ignored it and was happy with

18

his question and let Mr. Wayment answer and did not follow up

19

on a qualified answer, not an unqualified answer. Yes. Period.

20

Is unqualified. Yes, it would be reasonable is a qualified

21

answer. And he provided clarification to that. Your Honor, I do

22

not think the Court has to go there. The Court doesn't have to

23

worry about whether a pro in Utah customarily--although, that

24

is a fact issue that I think precludes summary judgment. You

25

have Mr. Kartchner on the one hand, and you've got Mr. Wayment
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1

and Mr. Dehlin on the other hand saying--you know, they have

2

different views about the way things operate in Utah. When a

3

pro is competing with amateurs and using the same tee that they

4

do and expects to get prizes, that's a fact issue regardless.

5

But you don't have to go there, Your Honor.

6

Ask them to show you where Nate Wade made an offer to

7

any participant in that contest to give them a car if they made

8

a hole-in-one. It's not on the rule sheet. It's not on the tee

9

box. It's nowhere. And for that reason, Your Honor, we ask the

10

Court to deny their motion for summary judgment with prejudice.

11

Because, at this point--well, if we're going to let Mr. Wayment

12

still claim that he saw that sign on the tee box, I guess we

13

can go to trial and hear from the two people playing with him

14

that didn't see that sign and decide who the Court is going to

15

believe. But if he's backing off of that testimony now, as his

16

declaration implies, there was no sign on the tee box promising

17

a car, then there was no offer to accept. If there was no

18

offer, the terms of which could be ambiguous. If I or you

19

parked a car on a tee box and say I'm sponsoring this hole, it

20

does not under Utah law translate into an obligation to give

21

your car to someone who hits a hole-in-one. That doesn't.

22

That's not enough.

23

I appreciate your time, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

All right. Thank you.
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1

MR. WAHLQUIST:

You've given me a lot of time and

2

we're into your lunch period. Can you tolerate ten more

3

minutes?

Ii,

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. WAHLQUIST:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. WAHLQUIST:

I can, yes.
All right.

You're okay.
I just want to address real briefly

8

Ryan Kartchner. I think it's interesting what Mr. Morris had to

9

say about him, as if he were just some foreign to this

10

experience and could have no background from which to render an

11

opinion regarding whether Mr. Wayment acted reasonably or not.

12

In their opposition to the memorandum, in their Exhibit E, is

13

the declaration of Mr. Kartchner, the one that we suggest was

14

in opposition to some of the testimony that he gave at his

15

deposition in that he adopts as his testimony Mr. Morris'

16

designation of what Mr. Kartchner's testimony will be at trial.

17

In opinion number eight on page four of that designation by Mr.

18

Morris, he says, quote--if you're on page four, opinion eight,

19

I'm starting about the sixth line down to the right-hand side

20

of the sentence where it says in fact. Do you see that?

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Uh-huh.
"In fact, because Mr. Kartchner will

23

testify there was no sign on the tee box indicating the car was

24

available to anyone making a hole-in-one, a professional golfer
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1

in Mr. Wayment's position could not reasonably have the

2

expectation Mr. Dehlin ascribes to him."

3

So I guess what I'm saying is the very--one of the

4

very opinions he's putting up for here is whether someone in

5

Mr. Wayment's position could have reasonably expected that he

6

was eligible to win that car. Mr. Morris says he's going to

7

testify that he's not. He's going to testify that he's not

8

eligible. I take his deposition and he says yes it would be

9

reasonable for Mr. Wayment under the circumstances to expect

10

that he was eligible for the car. And now Mr. Morris comes back

11

today and says who's Ryan Kartchner?

12

And what background does he possibly have to allow

13

him to opine on whether it's reasonable? Well, that's the very

14

thing they put him up for on opinion number eight, prior to the

15

time I took his deposition. And so obviously he's being put

16

forward as someone--as an expert having the background to

17

examine the facts and render an opinion on whether Mr. Wayment

18

could have reasonably expected to be eligible for the prize.

19

And now that he's, in deposition, expressed that

20

opinion, the challenge is being put forward saying well he's

21

not qualified to do that because that requires him to know some

22

background. Well, he's either an expert or he's not. And if

23

he's not, we ought to just strike his entire declaration here

24

because he's not entitled to give an opinion. He's not talking

25

about his firsthand experience here as a fact witness, he's
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1

doing an expert opinion on the very thing he was asked to do

2

when he was deposed. He declined to give the answer that Mr.

3

Morris liked and so now he's seeming to say his own expert

4

witness cannot testify about the very thing he has put forth an

5

opinion to testify about just because his opinion now, under

6

deposition, was contrary to what Mr. Morris said he would

7

te·s ti fy about.

8

I'm not going to address all the issues Mr. Morris

9

covered. I don't think they deserve any more time. I think you

10

understand my position. You listened to me for an hour before.

11

But I do want to just sum up with a couple of observations.

12

First of all, much of what Mr. Morris had to say was there was

13

no offer being made here to anybody. You know, these

14

participants in this golf tournament weren't from Mars. They

15

weren't even from outer Mongolia somewhere. They were from a

16

life experience where people go golfing. And they may not be

17

good golfers or frequent golfers or whatever, but when you go

18

to a golf tournament and you get given a rule sheet and it says

19

hole-in-one and then you go to the hole and there's a car there

20

and Nate Wade Subaru sign is prominently there, everybody

21

understands what the deal is. The outward manifestations are

22

very clear.

23

There was a little bit of a sidestep in the argument

24

I heard from Mr. Morris when he's talking about the North

25

Dakota Supreme Court opinion in Harms. Remember, that's the one
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1

where she went--she did it off the women's tee box instead of

2

the men's and they said well we intended it to be the men's, we

3

just didn't tell anybody about it. And then the quote that he

4

read said that Northland, the dealer, must abide by the rules

5

it announced, not the ones it left unannounced. And, also, they

6

would be bound by the rules that were in that rule sheet. Well,

7

that car dealer didn't put up the rule sheet. The organizer

8

did. And it's what the sponsor allows the organizer to

9

represent.

10

It's all an out--the manifestation to the offeree.

11

You know, you have everything that's going on there. You have

12

Nate Wade Subaru intended to offer that car to somebody. They

13

said we offered it anybody except for pros. The argument

14

they're making now is kind of like saying we intended it for

15

everybody but red heads. But Mr. Wahlquist somehow accidentally

16

got a hole-in-one so we're not going to give it to him. We have

17

unspoken, uncommunicated conditions that we can throw in after

18

the fact. You can't do that. And that's exactly what that Harms

19

case was about. You have to communicate.

20

It's the manifestations that are given to a person

21

going· through the experience. What is he reasonably going to

22

think? There's not a person who went up to the eighth hole on

23

June 1, 2015, who didn't believe if they hit a hole-in-one they

24

would get that car. And if Mr. Morris were being candid with

25

this Court, he would admit that. He's been to a number of
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1

tournaments himself. No reasonable person, under those

2

circumstances, seeing a hole-in-one thing on the rules sheet

3

and going to the hole, seeing the car, would think that there

4

was anything other than that. That is a very common prize for a

5

hole-in-one in a tournament. And a reasonable person having any

6

experience on this earth with golf, a golf tournament, would

7

understand that. And that's what Mr. Wayment understood. It's

8

what he reasonably understood, as admitted by their own expert

9

in the course of this deposition.

10

This is no more than the Harms case and the Cobaugh

11

case. Where after the fact the car dealer is trying to impose

12

uncommunicated limitations on somebody who happened to accept

13

the offer and form a contract by performing the feat. And

14

Cobaugh, it was the wrong tournament. But the court said too

15

bad. You left your car there. There's a sign there. And this

16

person, Mr. Cobaugh, who hit that hole-in-one two days after

17

the tournament, in his own tournament, understood reasonably

18

when he went up there that that was a car that he could win.

19

Now, there's no question the dealer didn't anticipate

20

that. That wasn't the dealer's subjected offer. But that's what

21

was manifest by having a car on the hole on a hole-in-one

22

contest in a tournament. And the court said too bad. If you

23

didn't want that, you shouldn't have had the offer out there

24

two days later for somebody to take advantage of.
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1

Harms, same thing. We're hearing a Harms argument

2

here now. We didn't intend it to extend to pros. Yeah, we

3

didn't communicate it to anybody, but we didn't intend it. And

4

so, because there was no limitation communicated, somehow

5

there's no offer. You have to have an express offer that says,

6

you know, these people out there who do it get this car.

7

There's no requirement in the law that you have to do that.

8

Like the Walters case says, if you put something out there in

9

the public, if someone performs--you know, if you do this--you

10

know, if someone performs, they get the prize. And that's what

11

we have here. And Nate Wade Subaru's attempt to excuse itself

12

now for its uncommunicated limitations that it held internally

13

should not be--you know, should not be taken into account here.

14

They're irrelevant.
What is important is what was offered to Mr. Wayment

15

16

and everybody else who showed up at that tournament that

17

morning. And we have no admissible evidence under the law that,

18

I went into some length earlier, that would raise an issue of

19

material fact with respect to that. It was reasonable. A

20

contract was formed. It's been breached and we're entitled to

21

summary judgment giving us the dollar amount. We ask you to do

22

that.

23

THE COURT:

Thank you.

24

MR. WAHLQUIST:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

1

2

add?

3

MR. MORRIS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Did you have anything more you wanted to

Well--

~

I'll give you a brief minute, if you want

to.

6

MR. MORRIS:

Just two quick things, Your Honor.

7

Those other cases had signs on the tee box saying you

8

win a car if you make a hole-in-one. That's what that guy two

9

days later saw. It wasn't just a car and a dealership logo.

10

There was a sign promising a hole-in-one in that case. This

11

case, no such sign, unless we have to go to trial and test Mr.

12

Wayment' s deposition testimony.

13

Secondly, Mr. Kartchner, at the award ceremony when

14

he announced Mr. Wayment's hole-in-one, his words to Mr.

15

Wayment were "Good luck getting that car, Mr. Kartchner." Mr.

16

Wayment. Mr. Kartchner knew--and there's a distinction between

17

the opinion that Mr. Wahlquist read from that there's an

18

opinion as to pros generally--which was the opinion number

19

eight in his--in the designation of expert testimony. But there

20

was also Mr. Wayment's personal subjective experiences. None of

21

which, Mr. Kartchner could be expected to know at the

22

conclusion of that deposition. He didn't know what he saw.

23

Didn't know who he talked to. Didn't know what he heard. And so

24

that's why there's no problem with or inconsistency between my

25

saying Mr. Kartchner is qualified to testify about what pros
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1

generally understand in Utah and his clarifying that, you know,

2

maybe there are some circumstances that Mr. Kartchner could

3

have that expectation. For example, in a tournament where there

4

are a lot of pros playing. If there were a bunch of pros

5

playing and the signs say pros are entitled to prizes if they

6

make a hole-in-one, well, in that circumstance, Mr. Kartchner

7

and we would all agree a pro's entitled to get the car. But

8

here, no. Because the--

9

~

The one fact I should have mentioned before and I'll

10

just leave the Court with this, the tournament, Mr. Schneider's

11

not going to sue the tournament, a charity, because it didn't

12

communicate to the world the limitations he told the tournament

13

about. That's undisputed. He's not doing that. But, the

14

tournament didn't turn around and make a mistake by sending out

15

the wrong information. It just didn't send out any information.

16

Any. It didn't tell anyone that you're going to win a car if

17

you make a hole-in-one. And that's why summary judgment is not

18

appropriate here.

19

Thank you, Your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

All right. Thank you. Okay. Give me a

21

minute. You can--if you'd like, take a ten minute break. If you

22

want to come back in ten of fifteen minutes, I'll have the

23

ruling for you.

24

MR. WAHLQUIST:

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.

From the bench.
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1

MR. WAHLQUIST:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WAHLQUIST:

4

THE COURT:

5

Yeah. Come on back at 1:00, 1:05.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay. You can stretch. Check your

voicemail. You probably have lots of calls.
{COURT IS IN RECESS)

6

7

Would you like us at 1:00?

THE COURT:

Okay. Is everybody ready? I'll go back on

8

the record--let's get all my notes here. Okay. Thank you for

9

the very good briefing on this. I hope your attorney's fees do

10

not become more than this car is worth because there's a lot of

11

good work that went into this and I appreciate all of the work

12

that you've put in.

13

So, let me first talk about the facts that I think

14

are not in dispute right now. The first is that Nate Wade

15

sponsored a hole-in-one contest on the eighth hole. On the rule

16

sheet, it says that--it says hole-in-one. It doesn't say what

17

the prize is. When you go look at the eighth hole, it said that

18

Nate Wade was sponsoring it. So, I think there's no dispute

19

that Nate Wade did sponsor a hole-in-one contest. Also, the

20

evidence is that Nate Wade procured insurance in order to do

21

this. That they drove a car--an employee drove a car to the

22

tournament which was displayed at the eighth hole at the tee

23

box. And that after the plaintiff made a hole-in-one, that the

24

employee of Nate Wade and the plaintiff Mr. Wayment had a

25

picture taken in front of this car.
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1

Second, that there's a rule sheet. And on that rule

2

sheet it said that there would be a hole-in-one competition at

3

hole eight.

4

5
6

Third, that there was a sponsor sign at hole eight
that said Nate Wade was sponsoring it.
I also find that Nate Wade did in fact intend to

7

offer a car to any amateur who made a hole-in-one. That this

8

was an agreement between Nate Wade and the sponsors of the

9

tournament. So, subjectively, in fact they did intend to offer

10

a car. Specifically, they wanted to offer it to any amateur.

11

But there was an intent that the prize would be a car in fact.

12

Now, there really are two issues here. One is

13

whether--let me make sure--whether Nate Wade manifested an

14

intention that the car would be a prize. And the argument as I

15

understand it from Nate Wade was yes we did intend to offer a

16

car as a prize to amateurs. That was in our agreement with the

17

sponsors of this tournament. But we didn't advertise that fact

18

to the participants. There's no information. There are no

19

signs. There's nothing in the rules saying that anyone would

20

win this car. This was an argument strictly between Nate Wade

21

and the sponsors of this tournament.

22

But, the controlling law in a prize winning contest

23

looks to the offerer as the person offering the prize and the

24

party on the other side as the contestants who perform the feat

25

in order to win that prize. It's not between the offerer and in
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
801-285-9495 / thackertranscripts@gmail.com
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00752

Motion for Summary Judgment - September 30, 2016
59

1

this case the sponsors of the tournament. When you have a prize

2

winning contest, the law looks at what is understood between

3

the side--the offerer, the side that is sponsoring this

4

contest, and what contestants in that contest could reasonably

5

understand. Those are the two sides of this contract. It's not

6

just limited--once it becomes a prize winning situation, it's

7

not just limited to the sponsors. There are people who are

8

competing who understand that they can win something if they

9

can pull off a certain feat.

10

So, looking at Walters v. National Beverages, which

11

is from the Utah Supreme Court 1967, "We are in accord with the

12

general rule that in prize winning contests where an offer or

13

promise is made in exchange for an act to be performed on the

14

part of the contestant, the performance of that act is an

15

acceptance of the off er and results in a binding contract."

16

So, just for clarification, the terms are between the

17

offerer and the contestants. Now, that doesn't say what the

18

terms are. But those are the parties to this contract and it

19

becomes binding once the contestant performs the feat based on

20

whatever terms a reasonable contestant could understand.

21

Now, second, the issue is Nate Wade's argument that

22

well we didn't say what the prize would be. Yes, we're

23

sponsoring the hole-in-one contest but never did we say that

24

you would win--that a person could win a car. And in this

25

situation, we don't have any written--this isn't a written
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1

contract. This isn't a situation where two parties sit down and

2

hammer out a written agreement. There are a few writings but

3

not anything that's extremely detailed. The offerees here are a

4

lot of different people. It's people in this golf tournament

5

who go up to the eighth hole.

6

The question is, what would those people understand?

7

So, what I have to do is look at the intentions that were

8

manifested to the participants. Specifically, here we have the

9

rule sheet that says there is a hole-in-one contest. We have a

10

sign at hole eight that says Nate Wade is sponsoring that hole.

11

And I think most importantly, we have a car sitting there. And

12

based on that, I find that it was not only reasonable for

13

participants to think that they could win a car by making a

14

hole-in-one, but it was in fact correct that they could win a

15

car for making a hole-in-one if they were an amateur.

16

Nate Wade did intend to offer that car, and we can't

17

lose sight of that fact. They were offering that car. It was

18

the prize on the eighth hole and it was communicated in such a

19

way through the parking of the car there and the sign saying

20

that Nate Wade was sponsoring and knowing that there was a

21

specific competition going on at this hole, that it was

22

reasonable and in fact correct, to assume that that car was a

23

prize for getting a hole-in-one. But what Nate Wade points out:

24

just not to professionals like Mr. Wayment.
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1

Which leads to the final question that I have to

2

answer, which is was it reasonable for Mr. Wayment to think

3

that he could win this prize, that he was eligible for this

4

prize? There's no dispute that there were not any explicit

5

instructions or rules given to the participants that

6

professionals were not eligible for prizes. It's not in any of

7

the writings that I just referred to, the rules or any signage

8

at the eighth hole.

9

~

I also will note in looking through the exhibits to

10

the motion for summary judgment, in Exhibit A, it's the

11

deposition of Brandon Riley who was from Big League Dreams and

12

it says on page 11, "Question: There's nothing during these

13

meetings--did you ever discuss whether professionals could be

14

allowed to participate in the events? No. It was just not

15

something that came up? No. And there was also no discussion of

16

excluding professional golfers from receiving any prizes, is

17

that correct?" Then there was an objection that it was leading.

18

The answer is, "There was no discussion about professionals."

19

So what Mr. Riley says is not only--is that in the planning for

20

this, it wasn't discussed we're only limiting prizes to

21

amateur. So, even in the plan for the event, that was not

22

discussed. That was not communicated to participants.

23

On page 14, question, "Did you give any oral

24

instructions apart from those on the list, this rule sheet that

25

you said was put on the cart about the exclusion of
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1

professional golfers from participating in any of the prize

2

contests? Not that I recall. I don't remember. Is it something

3

you even thought about? Probably not."

4

And then in the deposition of Mr. Kartchner, which is

5

Exhibit F to the motion for summary judgment, on page 16 of his

6

deposition the question is, "Did Hidden Valley give any oral

7

instructions at the event stating that professional golfers

8

were excluded from participating in any of the prize contests?

9

No. Did anyone at Hidden Valley hear any statement from anyone

10

else at the tournament to that affect? I did not, no. Was

11

Hidden Valley asked by anyone to determine the player status of

12

any of the tournament participants? No. Did Hidden Valley

13

nevertheless undertake to determine the player status of any of

14

the participants? No."

15

vjp

So, it's not disputed that there wasn't a plan to try

16

to exclude professional golfers beforehand from--it wasn't

17

discussed whether they should be excluded. There was not an

18

effort made to try to identify professional golfers who might

19

be competing or participating in the tournament. And there were

20

never any instructions given to participants that professional

21

golfers could not win any prizes. So, there wasn't any

22

information that was passed on, which leads to the question of

23

should Mr. Wayment have just known, as a professional golfer in

24

Utah himself, that this just isn't done. Which is where we get

25

into the expert testimony. I have Mr. Wayment's declaration
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1

that he himself thought he could do it based on his experience.

2

I have plaintiff's expert saying that it was reasonable for him

3

to assume this.

4

But the question for me now is not to weigh evidence

5

but whether I have a dispute of fact that needs to be tried on

6

the merits. So that does come down to the deposition of Mr.

7

Kartchner who is the defendant's expert. And what I will say

8

here, looking at his answer to the questions about--the

9

questions that are on page 10 of the motion for summary

10

judgment, I will consider his clarifications to his deposition,

11

but I still think that it is a definitive answer. I think that

12

when he's asked, even though your personal--even though that's

13

your personal practice, do you believe it is reasonable that

14

Mr. Wayment believed he would be eligible to participate in the

15

prize on the hole sponsored by Nate Wade Subaru? Yes, I believe

16

it would be reasonable in some circumstances. I think that's a

17

definitive answer.

18

He knows the circumstances of this situation. He
<&iJ

19

worked for the golf course. He knew the circumstances. He knew

20

what was conveyed to participants. He knew what the rule sheet

21

said. He might not know what was going on inside Mr. Wayment's

22

head, but that's not the question. It's not the subjective

23

intent of Mr. Wayment. It was the overall surroundings of that

24

tournament and would it be reasonable for a golfer at that

25

tournament, a professional golfer at that tournament, to think

<iJ

~
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1

that he was eligible to win this prize. And I think that Mr.

2

Kartchner is giving a definitive answer here, yes, I believe it

3

would be reasonable in some circumstances. But we know the

4

circumstances. So he has them before him in this situation.

5

~

6

of Nate Wade was to offer a car to amateurs. Looking at the

7

intentions that were manifested to participants at this

8

tournament, a reasonable participant would have understood that

9

a car could be won from getting a hole-in-one on the eighth

10

hole. The fact that that was limited to amateurs was never

11

communicated to anyone.

12

~

So, my conclusions are that the subjective intention

So, when Mr. Wayment made a hole-in-one on that hole,-

13

that resulted in a binding contract to win the car. And having

14

new requirements expressed afterward that maybe Nate Wade

15

wanted to convey, wished would have been conveyed but simply

16

were not conveyed, those limitations weren't conveyed to

17

participants, and so once Mr. Wayment did what needed to be

18

done under these circumstances, it was reasonable for him to

19

believe that he should have won the car. And on that basis and

20

the undisputed information before me, I'll grant the motion for

21

summary judgment.

22

Is there any questions or any clarification that

23

anyone has? Okay. Can you proposed order and circulate it?

24

MR. WAHLQUIST:

25

THE COURT:

That would be fine, Your Honor.

Okay.
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1

MR. WAHLQUIST:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MORRIS:

4

Thank you very much.

All right. Okay. Thank you everyone.
Thank you, Your Honor.
(COURT IS IN RECESS)

5

6

~

7
8
9

~

10
11

12

Gil

13

14
15
16
17
18

~

19

20
21

~

22
23
24

25
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Mark 0. Morris (4636)
Ricky Shelton (14784)
SNELL

& WILMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1531
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
mmorris@swlaw.com
rshelton@swlaw.com
Attorneys for Nate JVade Subant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRETT WAYMENT
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF TODD TANNER

v.
SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, dba
NATE WADE SUBARU,

Civil No. 150905943
Judge Paige Peterson

Defendant.
I, Todd Tanner, hereby declare as follows:

1.

I am over the age of eighteen.

2.

I reside at 11275 Scobey circle Sandy Utah 84070.

3.

My phone number is (801) 554-1665.

4.

For 18 years, I have been a professional goiter in the state of Utah.

5.

Among professionals in the golf industry, it has been and remains a custom and

commonly understood requirement that professional golfers participating in amateur golf
events, with amateurs, must disclose their professional status. This would allow the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tournament organizers to ~count for any advantages and contests for which a
professional golfer would have an unfair advantage, for example not using the back tees
on holes.
~

6.

In the golf industry, it is commonly understood that professional golfers are not

eligible for competition prizes, such as a hole-in-one contest, unless the competition
explicitly says otherwise.

7.

For example, in July of 2005 at the Utah Open Pro-Am, I made a hole-in-one

shot at a hole that designated a car prize for a hole-in-one shot. I did not receive the
prize, however, because I was a professional golfer at the time. I anticipated this result
because it aligned with custom and commonly understood requirements in the golf
industry.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, I declare under criminal penalty of the State of
Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 21 day of December, 2015

Todd Tanner
[Signature]
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SUBARU OF AMERICA
Vehicle Invoice
.-.,_..,•• -;_._.- · • - - ' •

.•

••.

··~·-----..~~·•~♦-~--··,.;~.~• • ~....... ~-~~.......,....~~~-~~-~~--

SUBARU OF AMERICA/WEST REGION
22100 E. 26TH AVENUE, SUITE 140
AURORA, CO 80019

VIN:
Invoice Number:
Invoice Dale:
P.O. Number:

Sold To:
090543
NATE WADE SUBARU
1207 S MAIN ST

Ffn.snclng OrganlzaUon:
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
2460 SOUTH 3270 WEST

Item

Item Description

FRC

2016 XV Crosslrek 2.0I Premium CVT
Dark ~ray Metallic
Black

BLC

II

WEST VALLEY CITY, UT 84119

SALT LAKE CllY, UT 84111 US

DGM

JF2GPACC1FH219454
113190330
01/08/15

$23,295.00

$22,071.00

$72,00
$850.00

$46.00
$850.00

OpUon Package 12
Standard Model
All Weather Floor Mais
Standard OesUnallon Charge

BCA
STD

...... ....· .........._,_
...,,;.,

.$u_.211~00

Total Vehicle Price Before Discount

$22.967.00

Total Vehicle Price After Discount

~----.t!~~~~. ---....---....,··---·--". .·-..·•

.-'·•--N·.~-~

·-r.

HB 0466

.

... -~-·-·._~...,.~..~

FP 0200

Vehicle ldentificatron
JF2GPACC1 FH219454

Engine Number

Key Code

Port

964066

37166

Vancouver, WA

Curb Weight
3186.0

PZEV Cal Spec SO State Certlfled
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EXHIBIT

1:
2015 Big League Dreams Foundation

'

Goff Tournament

Man tea off from Blu& TeJs. Women from Sliver Tees.
Format Is a 4 person Scramble. All players tee off from respective tee box. Choose the best
drtve and an players play next shot from there {within a club length, no closer to the hole and no
Improved lie). Procedure Is followed on each shot ror the remainder of the hole. With pulls, the
first ball to go fn the hole Is counted for the team score. Do not 'tap In' bofore all players have
taken their shot.

~

Valley Course 111 - Longest Drive contest (Men & Women). Must be In the fairway to count.
Valley Coursa 18 - Hole In One
Lakes Course #4 • Longest Putt (Men & Women)
Lakes Courso f/7 • Closest to the Pin (Men & Women
Lake Course 1/6 - All prayers m_µst tee off with the baseball bat on the baseball tee. Scramble
rules the rest of the way.
:
I

~

•

Ucorfce Rope (Must be purchased at registration) • One allowed per team. May be used to
complete any puU(s). Must tear of lhe distance used. Onao all length of the rope Is used, no
addltfonal 'gimmes' are allowed.
Mulligans (Must be purchased at regfetratlon) - One allowed per person for tho round. Allows
you to hit your shot again. Onaa you hll a second shot, the mulligan Is used and can't be used
again, regardless of whether you use that second ehol.

2015 Blg League Dreams Foundation
Golf Tournament
Men tee off from Blue Tees. Women from Sliver Teas.
Format Is a 4 person Scramble. , All playel'8 tee off from respective tee box. Choose the best
drive and all players play next shot-from theta (within a club length. no closer to the hole and no
lmproved lie). Procedure Is followed on each shot for the remalnder of the hole. With putts, the
first.ball lo go In tha hole Is counted for the team score. Do not 'tap In' before an players have
taken their shot.
•
Vatrey CDUl'$8 #1 .. Longest Drive contest (Men & Women). Must be In the fairway to count.
Valrey Course #8 - Hare In One
Lakes Course #4 - Longest Putt (Men & Women)
lakes Course #7 • Closest to the Pin (Men & Women
Lake Course #18 - All players muBl tee off with the baseball bat on the baseball tee. Scramble .

rules the rest of the way.
Ucctfce Rope (Must be purchased at reglstralfon) • One allowed per team. May be used to
complete any putt(s). Must tear of tha distance used. Once all length of the rope Is used, no
addlUonal 'gimmes' are allowed.

~

Mulllgans (Musi be purchased at registration) • One allowed per person for the routid. Allows

you to hit your shot again. Once you hit a second shot, the mulligan Is used and can't be used

again, regardless of whether you use thet second shot.

NWS000012
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Valley Hole #8
Big League Dreams Foundation Thanks

Nate Wade Subaru
Nate Wade Subaru

2015 Big League Dreams Foundation
Tournament Hole Sponsor
,,,.-...,,,
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